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Abstract
Known as the fog of war, uncertainty has been prevalent in the conduct of mil-
itary operations throughout human history. Intelligence collection efforts are tasked
to reduce this uncertainty through the collection of information. Utilizing Shannon’s
entropy as a measure of the expected information gain due to an intelligence collec-
tion effort, a methodology is developed to prioritize and allocate intelligence assets
in an efficient manner. Incorporated in this methodology are target priority and the
requirement to reassess dynamic targets. The application area for the methodol-
ogy is Effects-Based Operations. A generalized state model is developed to conduct
adversary system-of-systems analysis. This model forms the basis for the entropy
calculations and the resultant integer program to maximize the information gain.
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Reducing Uncertainty in Effects-Based Operations
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
[U]ncertainty seems to increase of its own accord unless something is done
to reduce it. [14]
Known as the fog of war, uncertainty has been prevalent in the conduct of
military operations throughout human history. As friendly forces act and react, an
adversary also continues to act and react. Without continuous intelligence updates,
the uncertainty associated with an assessment of the adversary’s current state will
continue to grow. Add to the continual need for intelligence a limited supply of
intelligence resources, and the problem becomes one of asset allocation, the goal of
which is to maximize information gain.
Increasingly, intelligence collection has become the limiting factor in performing
military operations as there will always be less intelligence collection opportunities
than intelligence targets. Vying for these limited intelligence collection opportuni-
ties are a number of agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence
Agency, National Security Agency, etc.). The limited intelligence collection efforts
allocated to military operations must be efficiently used in order to properly charac-
terize the current state of an adversary.
The problem of allocating intelligence resources can be related to the field of
computer adaptive tests (CAT) like the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) and
Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT). At the beginning of the test, the
CAT has no information on the subject’s mastery of the material. The CAT assumes
a prior probability distribution on the subject’s mastery level. Then, the test must
select resources (e.g., questions) to reduce its uncertainty in assessing the subject’s
mastery level. To do so, the CAT selects the question that will reduce the expected
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uncertainty the most. Once the subject answers the question, the test updates the
prior distribution and selects another question to maximize information gain (i.e.,
minimize uncertainty). The process is repeated until the subject’s mastery level is
known. [15]
The same kind of process can be applied to an intelligence collection effort.
Intelligence analysts typically provide qualitative assessments of an adversary entity’s
current state using linguistic quantifiers, or “words of estimative probability” (e.g.,
Almost certain, Probably, etc.). For example, an intelligence analyst may give the
precise location of an airfield, but may provide a judgement or estimate of the use
of the airfield (e.g., “It is almost certainly a military airfield”). It is this linguistic
estimate that is the source of the probabilistic uncertainty. [11] A prior probability
distribution can be assigned to these linguistic quantifiers to describe an adversary’s
current state. Then based on the effectiveness of the available intelligence collection
assets, the assets can be efficiently allocated to collect information on the adversary.
After the intelligence collection efforts, the prior probability distributions are updated,
and the process is repeated.
Military intelligence targets do not have equal priority. Certain entities will
be high priority targets that require a reduction in the uncertainty of their current
states (e.g., location of weapons of mass destruction, location of senior adversary
leadership, etc.). Although not desired, higher uncertainty in the assessment of lesser
priority intelligence targets’ current states may be tolerated. Intelligence collection
efforts must be directed to collect information on the most uncertain, highest priority
adversary entities.
Additionally, an adversary is continually acting and reacting to friendly (blue)
force actions; therefore, unlike CATs, an adversary’s current state will never be known
with total (or near) certainty. Management of the uncertainty is thus extremely impor-
tant. Intelligence collection efforts must be repeatedly tasked to collect information
on adversary systems (nodes) that have been assessed already.
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Finally, in current operations, when an action is taken on an adversary entity,
intelligence assets are tasked to collect information on that entity (e.g., bomb damage
assessment (BDA)). This use of intelligence assets is warranted if the action taken on
an entity has a low probability of success or has an unknown effect. For example,
the probabilities of success associated with nonkinetic operations are often low or
unknown. These nonkinetic operations thus require subsequent intelligence collection
efforts to characterize the effectiveness of the operations. On the other hand, if an
action is taken on an entity that has a high probability of success and has known
outcomes, then using an intelligence asset to collect information on the entity may not
be the best use of the intelligence asset (i.e., may not provide the greatest information
gain). Therefore, prioritizing intelligence assets must account for actions that are
planned against the entities.
1.2 Problem Statement
Perfect knowledge of an adversary is never truly obtained. Considerable uncer-
tainty is always present in characterizing the current state of an adversary. Formally,
uncertainty is defined below. [1]
uncertainty: estimated amount or percentage by which an observed or calculated
value may differ from the true value
In particular, uncertainty is present in describing the current state of an adversary’s
entities (e.g., radars, tanks, leaders, economy, etc.). The goal is to reduce this un-
certainty in an efficient manner. Thus, the problem is prioritizing intelligence assets
to maximize information gain while bound to intelligence asset constraints. The pri-
oritization of intelligence assets must take into consideration target priority and the
need to reassess dynamic targets. To accomplish this, the following are required:
- Mathematical model of an adversary’s entities
- Mathematical representation of linguistic quantifiers used by the intelligence
community (e.g., Probably, Almost certain, etc.)
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- Formal measure of the uncertainty associated with an adversary’s entities
- Priority, planned action, and dynamic updating of the intelligence assessment
associated with an adversary’s entities
- Methodology to allocate intelligence collection assets to collect information on
an adversary’s entities.
1.3 Summary of Current Knowledge
1.3.1 Effects-Based Operations. The Effects-based Operations (EBO) pro-
cess provides a framework from which adversary system uncertainty can be measured.
According to the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) Pamphlet 7 on EBO, the current
working definition of EBO is:
Operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a
holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence
or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application
of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims. [10]
EBO aim to “promote synchronized, overlapping, near simultaneously executed ac-
tions” through a “commonly shared system understanding of the adversary and
the operational environment by all members of the joint, interagency, multinational
team.” In order to gain further understanding and situational awareness of an adver-
sary and the operational environment, a System-of-Systems Analysis (SoSA) is de-
veloped. Each node within the network represents a person, place, or physical thing
that is a fundamental component of the adversary’s system. The linkages connecting
the nodes represent the behavioral, physical, or functional relationships between the
nodes. By developing a interrelated network of a region or nation of interest, planners
aim to take a holistic view of the operational environment. [10]
1.3.2 Uncertainty. Uncertainty may arise from making observations about
ill-defined (or complex) concepts. In addition, uncertainty may arise from creating
rules relating events, when the knowledge of the correlations between events is weak.
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When a system (or concept) is too complex to accurately model, observing outputs
based on inputs to the system can lead to drawing false conclusions about the sys-
tem. Other sources of uncertainty include the aggregation of multiple sources. This
often leads to inconsistencies or “over-estimat[ion] of the likelihood of events due to
assumed, but untrue, dependencies.” [14] Further uncertainty can come from trying
to measure time-dependent variables. These variables change over time, and thus are
subject to temporal uncertainties. Overall, the sources of uncertainty are applica-
tion dependent. The two major sources of uncertainty for EBO are Haimes’ top-level
categorizations: natural variability and knowledge uncertainty. [8] Natural variabil-
ity is due to population variances, and knowledge uncertainty rises from a lack of
understanding or missing knowledge.
The major sources of EBO natural variability are temporal, spatial, and indi-
vidual heterogeneous [8]. Temporal variability is value fluctuation due to changes
over time. Spatial variability relates to fluctuations due to location or area. All other
natural variability is captured by individual heterogeneous.
EBO knowledge uncertainty can be attributed to four main sources: decision
uncertainty, incompleteness, inconsistency, and inaccuracy. Decision uncertainty is
the human subjectivity associated with decision making. Missing data is captured by
incompleteness. Inconsistency involves two pieces of contradicting information. The
final source of knowledge uncertainty is inaccuracy, which relates to incorrect data on
the current true state of a system.
1.3.3 Methods for Handling Uncertainty. The three most common models
used by the uncertainty community to address uncertainty are probability, possibility
and evidence theories. In addition, several other measures, like certainty factors, fuzzy
sets, and rough sets, are used to a lesser degree. Probability, possibility and evidence
theories are similar, but differ in “subtleties of meaning and application.” [14] All
three models are based on a distribution function that distributes some measure of
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uncertainty to the events of interest. This distribution can be based on statistical
data, physical possibility, or subject matter expert (SME) assessment.
The techniques for handling uncertainty fall into two broad categories: quan-
titative and qualitative. The quantitative techniques require enumeration of all the
required quantities; whereas, the qualitative techniques use either strictly qualitative
data or a mixture of qualitative and quantitative data. Each type of technique has its
benefits and drawbacks. The quantitative techniques maintain a high level of preci-
sion, but require vast amounts of data that is often times unattainable. On the other
hand, the qualitative techniques require less specific data but are much less precise.
In fact, the qualitative techniques can lead to no useful information being obtained
due to lack of specificity.
1.3.4 Measuring Uncertainty. In order to maximize information gain through
intelligence asset prioritization, it is necessary to measure the uncertainty present in
a system. Once a distribution has been assigned to the current state of the system
(or subsystem), a measure of uncertainty for the distribution is needed. The uncer-
tainty community has used two measures to quantify the uncertainty associated with
probability and possibility distributions. Shannon’s entropy is the commonly used
measure of uncertainty used for probabilities, and specificity is used to measure the
uncertainty for possibility distributions. The entropy of a random variable measures
its complexity, or degree of randomness. Given a higher entropy of a random variable,
it is harder to predict the value of the random variable. [7] Specificity is an extension
of Shannon’s entropy to possibility distributions.
1.3.5 Intelligence Asset Assignment. The allocation of intelligence collec-
tion efforts from multiple intelligence sources against multiple adversary entities can
be related to the integer program (IP) of assigning multiple resources to multiple con-
tainers, or knapsacks–the multiple knapsack problem. In allocating intelligence assets,
however, the costs (i.e., used intelligence resources) and benefits (i.e., information
gain) associated with each adversary entity is dependent upon the intelligence asset
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assigned to collect information on it. The generalized assignment problem (GAP), a
more general IP, can be used to solve this problem. [12]
1.4 Assumptions
To prove out the methodology and maintain a practical level of analysis, the
following assumptions are made in this thesis:
- The adversary or SoSA network developed during the EBO process is assumed
to be a correct representation of an adversary. The existence of all nodes and
linkages are assumed to be known with certainty.
- The nodes of the SoSA network are assumed to be independent.
Based on the first assumption, this thesis does not address the you don’t know
what you don’t know problem. In military operations, this incompleteness source of
uncertainty is quite prevalent. However, without known existence, allocating resources
against these unknown nodes is not quantifiable. A simple solution is to allocate a
portion of the available assets to investigate the unknown nodes of the system.
The second assumption limits the measure of information gain on the targeted
node. The SoSA network includes linkages (i.e., influences) between the nodes. In-
corporating these linkages would more accurately represent the information gain due
to intelligence collection. For example, it may be easier to collect information on a
neighboring node, which may reduce the uncertainty on the targeted node.
1.5 Thesis Organization
This thesis is composed of five chapters. The present chapter provides a brief
background of the topic, a description of the problem to be addressed, and a summary
of the current knowledge. Chapter 2 delves further into the field of data uncertainty
as it relates to EBO. Methods for handling and measuring uncertainty, as well as
linguistic quantifiers are explored. Finally, the generalized assignment problem is
investigated.
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Chapter 3 presents a mathematical model for SoSA networks, which lays the
framework for a methodology to prioritize a single intelligence asset’s collection efforts.
This methodology is then applied to the problem of allocating multiple intelligence
assets. Chapter 4 applies these methodologies to a notional 20-node, 4-asset example.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the results and provides recommendations for future
research.
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II. Summary of Current Knowledge
2.1 Overview
This chapter presents a review of the current literature on Effects-Based Op-
erations (EBO), knowledge uncertainty, linguistic quantifiers, methods for handling
uncertainty, uncertainty measures, and the generalized assignment problem (GAP).
Each of these plays an integral part in designing a methodology for prioritizing intel-
ligence assets during EBO, which is addressed in Chapter 3.
2.2 Effects-Based Operations
According to the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) Pamphlet 7 on EBO, the
current working definition of EBO is:
Operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a
holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence
or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application
of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims. [10]
EBO aim to “promote synchronized, overlapping, near simultaneously executed ac-
tions” through a “commonly shared system understanding of the adversary and
the operational environment by all members of the joint, interagency, multinational
team.” This shared system understanding is enabled through a collaborative informa-
tion environment (CIE) and a operational net assessment (ONA). A CIE is a virtual
environment designed to improve collaboration and knowledge management across a
combatant command. ONA is a process and product that develops a comprehensive
system-of-systems understanding of the operational environment. [10]
In order to gain further understanding and situational awareness of an adver-
sary and the operational environment, ONA begins with a System-of-Systems Analysis
(SoSA). To develop a SoSA, the operational environment is assumed to be composed
of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) en-
tities (or systems). These six interrelated PMESII systems are represented pictorially
using a multi-dimensional network (see Figure 2.1 on the following page). Each node
9
JWFC Doctrine Pam 7 
17 November 2004 
10
 The ONA process begins when the combatant commander 
designates a priority (specific nation, region, contingency, or entity) within 
the AOR. The initial “baseline” ONA effort for a specific priority is to develop 
a system-of-systems analysis (SoSA)—an important sub-process of ONA—which 
populates the baseline ONA with data on PMESII systems and their organization, 
characteristics, and relationships.  This effort produces a nodal analysis which, 
along with effects development, forms the basis for coupling nodes to effects, 
actions to nodes, and resources to established E-N-A linkages.  Secondary and 
unintended effects also are considered during this process.  Joint force planners use 
this database—updated when a crisis is imminent—to develop, compare, and 
recommend effects-based COAs for the JFC’s decision. 
 As Figure 3 depicts, SoSA emphasizes a multi-dimensional approach toward 
understanding the battlespace, characterized by an analysis of six interrelated PMESII 
systems. Within each of these systems are nodes (a person, place, or physical thing 
that is a fundamental component of a system) and links (the behavioral, physical, or 
functional relationship between the nodes).  SoSA identifies the relationship between 
nodes within individual systems and 
across systems.  These nodes and 
associated links are then identified for 
DIME actions to influence or change 
system behavior and capabilities in 
order to achieve desired objectives. 
Understanding each of these 
systems and their interrelationships 
enables a holistic perspective of the 
operational environment.  Among 
other benefits, this perspective helps 
intelligence analysts identify potential 
sources from which to gain 
indications and warning and allows 
planners to consider a broader set of 
options to achieve objectives and 
focus limited resources.  It also 
increases the understanding of how 
individual actions on one element of 
the system can affect other 
interrelated system components.
 Both the SoSA and the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) 
are complementary processes that produce the awareness and understanding required 
to plan and execute EBO.  While JIPB doctrine provides for a broader perspective, JIPB 
activities generally have focused on the adversary’s military.  SoSA is intended to 
provide a comprehensive analysis across all PMESII systems.  The SoSA is a valuable  
FIGURE 3:  SYSTEM-OF-SYSTEMS 
Analyze the battlespace as a “system of 
systems.”
Understand the connectivity of key systems, 
nodes and links.
Identify decisive points for action to 









Figure 2.1: Systems-of-systems Analysis [10]
within the network represents a person, place, or physical thing that is a fundamental
component of the system. The linkages connecting the nodes represent the behavioral,
physical, or functional r lationships between the nodes. By developing a interrelated
network of a region or nation of interest, planners aim to take a holistic view of the
operational environment. [10]
2.3 Uncertai ty
According to the Merriam-Webster Concise Dictionary of English Language,
uncertainty is defined in the following manner:
uncertainty - 1: the quality or state of being uncertain; doubt, 2: some-
thing that is uncertain. [13]
and uncertain is defined as:
uncertain - 1: indefinite, indeterminate, 2: not certain to occur; prob-
lematical, 3: not reliable; untrustworthy, 4 a: not known beyond doubt;
dubious, b: not having certain knowledge; doubtful, c: not clearly identi-
fied or defined, 5: not constant; variable, fitful. [13]
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In other words, knowledge can be uncertain due to inaccurate measurement, vagueness
or ambiguity, variability, source reliability, etc. All of these uncertainties are easily
found in EBO. Inaccurate measurement can be seen in estimations of enemy troop
strengths. Vagueness is displayed in many intelligence assessments, where linguistic
quantifiers such as probable or possible are used. Variability is evident in the time
dependent nature of military operations, and source reliability is obviously evident in
human intelligence (HUMINT) collection.
In order to address uncertainty, one must look at the sources of the uncertainty.
To start, uncertainty may arise from making observations about ill-defined (or com-
plex) concepts. In addition, uncertainty may arise from creating rules relating events,
when the knowledge of the correlations between events is weak. When a system (or
concept) is too complex to accurately model, observing outputs based on inputs to the
system can lead to drawing false conclusions about the system. Often times a system
is assumed to be a black box that responds with certain observable state changes.
These observable state changes may be once, twice, or more times removed from the
actual system state changes. The primary system state changes may be unobserv-
able or indeterminate. Without further knowledge of the system, the conclusions
drawn based on the observed changes can be uncertain. These sources of uncertainty
are obviously present in EBO. The entire SoSA process is full of uncertainty due
to unknown and inaccurate linkages. For example, when trying to plan information
operations (IO), the forms of the adversary response (i.e., in what manner does an
adversary respond to IO) may not be fully known, or even observable, making it dif-
ficult to capture the impact of friendly actions. In turn, assumptions are developed
relating IO actions to planned effects. Obviously, there is a great deal of uncertainty
associated with planning these actions.
Other sources of uncertainty include the aggregation of multiple sources. This
often leads to inconsistencies or “over-estimat[ion] of the likelihood of events due to
assumed, but untrue, dependencies.” [14] Often in intelligence collection, this source
of uncertainty is displayed. For example, given three very unreliable sources of the
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same or similar intelligence, the intelligence analyst is more likely to assign a higher
probability to the event even though the independent sources only warrant a low
probability. The fact that multiple sources point out the same intelligence is the only
grounds the analyst has for increasing the assigned probability.
Further uncertainty can come from trying to measure time-dependent variables.
These variables change over time, and thus are subject to temporal uncertainties. For
example, intelligence data may take too long to analyze to remain valid or relevant.
Or intelligence data may not be attainable because events happen too quickly to
capture accurate and timely intelligence on them. Either way, temporal uncertainty
is present in the system analysis.
Overall, the sources of uncertainty are application dependent. In turn, the
techniques and methods for addressing data uncertainty are also application depen-
dent. In Qualitative Methods for Reasoning Under Uncertainty, Parsons argues for an
“eclectic school of thought”, where different techniques may be needed to address dif-
ferent situations depending on the predominant source or sources of uncertainty. [14]
To characterize the sources of uncertainty in EBO, an uncertainty taxonomy was
developed.
2.3.1 EBO Taxonomy. The literature presents multiple, varying uncertainty
taxonomies. Parsons, working in the field of artificial intelligence, analyzes several dif-
ferent taxonomies, and Haimes, working in the field of risk analysis, presents a single
taxonomy. [14] [8] Parsons’ analysis included Smithson’s [18], Smet’s [17], Bonissone
and Tong’s [2], and Bosc and Prade’s [4] taxonomies. Each of these taxonomies
presented a different construct for categorizing uncertainty. Parsons makes the argu-
ment that an overarching taxonomy for all uncertainty regardless of the application
is unattainable. However, Parsons notes there are some commonalities among the
uncertainty taxonomies. Each taxonomy contains some notion of subjective uncer-
tainty, vagueness, imprecision, incompleteness, inconsistency, and ambiguity. [14] The















Figure 2.2: EBO Data Uncertainty Taxonomy
For application to EBO, a taxonomy was constructed taking portions of each
of the reviewed taxonomies (see Figure 2.2). The two major sources of uncertainty
for EBO are Haimes’ top-level categorizations: natural variability and knowledge
uncertainty. [8] Natural variability is due to population variances. A situation with
a single entity would have no natural variability. For example, given a country of
interest, not all locations within the country will react in the same manner to some
action. Furthermore, the country may react differently given the timing of the action.
Knowledge uncertainty rises from a lack of understanding or missing knowledge. In
EBO, actions may result in unintended effects. This could be the result of planners
not possessing complete knowledge of a situation.
The major sources of natural variability are temporal, spatial, and individual
heterogeneous [8]. Temporal variability is value fluctuation due to changes over time.
For example, the effectiveness of IO action can be drastically affected by timing. An
operation that may be very successful on day 20 when civilian sentiment is fractional-
ized likely would not be as effective on day 1 when the population is unified. Spatial
variability relates to fluctuations due to location or area. An example of spatial
variability is the geographically separated religious sects in Iraq. All other natural
variability is captured by individual heterogeneous. This thesis will not address nat-
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ural variability. The SoSA network is assumed to be an accurate estimation of the
real system.
EBO knowledge uncertainty can be attributed to four main sources: decision
uncertainty, incompleteness, inconsistency, and inaccuracy. Decision uncertainty is
the human subjectivity associated with decision making. If two people are given the
same data, each might interpret the data differently resulting in different decisions.
Furthermore, subjective judgment regarding the reliability of data is captured in
decision uncertainty. Plus, different decision makers have different biases. This can
be seen in EBO when planners project previous experiences to new situations. For
example, a planner with extensive experience in operations in Southwest Asia may
naively apply the same techniques to an operation in Southeast Asia. Again, we
make the assumption that the SoSA network is constructed accurately and is not
interpreted differently by decision makers. Note, this human subjectivity can be
partially addressed through training and education.
Missing data is captured by incompleteness. As related to EBO, unknown nodes
and/or unknown influences are categorized as incompleteness uncertainty. This the-
sis assumes that all nodes and influences are known. Data that is lacking required
information or is at too broad of a resolution or fidelity is also classified as incom-
plete. This incompleteness is the target of this thesis effort. Intelligence data rarely
provides a definitive probability for an event or state of a system. In contrast, intelli-
gence usually gives linguistic quantifiers of the current state (i.e., confirmed, probable,
unknown, etc.).
Inconsistency involves two pieces of contradicting information. For example,
one intelligence source might indicate an enemy attack on position A whereas another
intelligence source might point at position B. This type of uncertainty is inconsistency.
The final source of knowledge uncertainty is inaccuracy, which relates to wrong data.
This thesis assumes that neither of these are present in the SoSA network.
14
One important note is that all of these sources of data uncertainty are not mu-
tually exclusive. In fact, the sources may be quite dependent on one another. For
instance, take the intelligence rating of an enemy attack as probable. The uncertainty
associated with the statement probable might be attributed to incompleteness or de-
cision uncertainty. The rating is incomplete because it does not contain complete
information regarding the event. This qualitative rating leads to further uncertainty,
decision uncertainty, when multiple decision makers are presented the data. Various
decision makers will most likely not interpret the rating the same.
2.4 Methods for Handling Uncertainty
2.4.1 Uncertainty Models. The three most commonly used models by the
uncertainty community to address uncertainty are probability, possibility and evidence
theories. In addition, several other measures, like certainty factors, fuzzy sets, and
rough sets, are used to a lesser degree. Probability, possibility and evidence theories
are similar, but differ in “subtleties of meaning and application.” [14] All three models
are based on a distribution function that distributes some measure of uncertainty to
the events of interest. This distribution can be based on statistical data, physical
possibility, or subject matter expert (SME) assessment.
2.4.1.1 Probability Theory. The basis for probability theory is the
probability distribution, which allocates a probability measure to specific events. The
probability distribution maps the events under consideration to the interval [0, 1]. An
event that is known to occur, or sure event, has probability 1.
P (sure event) = 1
Conversely, an event that is known to not occur has probability 0.
P (¬sure event) = 0
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Total probability states that the probability of an event and its negation equals 1.
P (A) + P (¬A) = 1
There are three axioms that define the behavior of the probability measure. First,
the convexity law states that the probability of event A given information H is once
again a probability measure.
0 ≤ P (A|H) ≤ 1
Second, the additive law relates the probability of two events to the probability of
their union. Given two mutually exclusive events A and B,
P (A ∪B|H) = P (A|H) + P (B|H).
In turn, the sum of the probabilities of all mutually exclusive and collectively exhaus-
tive events equals 1. Finally, the multiplication law relates the probability of two
events happening together to their intersection.
P (A ∩B|H) = P (A|H) · P (B|A ∩H)
Or more generally,
P (E1, E2, . . . , En) = P (En|E1, E2, . . . , En−1) · . . . · P (E2|E1) · P (E1).




P (A|Bi) · P (Bi)
and Bayes’ Theorem:




2.4.1.2 Possibility Theory. According to Parsons, possibility theory is
a “non-statistical means of quantifying uncertainty based on . . . fuzzy set theory.” [14]
The basis for possibility theory is the possibility distribution, which maps all the
possible values of a variable to the interval [0, 1]. In possibility theory, an impossible
event has possibility of 0.
πx(u) = 0
Whereas, a possible event has possibility of 1.
πx(u) = 1
In other words, setting πx equal to 0 completely rules out x. Whereas, setting πx equal
to 1 just says that x is not ruled out. In the interval (0, 1), πx relates the possibility
of events, where the possibility of some events is more possible than others. Given
all the possible values, then according to the normalization condition, at least one is
possible.
∃u, πx(u) = 1
Possibility theory captures complete knowledge by the following:
∃u0, πx(u0) = 1
∀u 6= u0, πx(u) = 0.
And complete ignorance by:
∀u, πx(u) = 1.
Next, when given multiple sources of information, the principle of minimum
specificity states the possibility distribution that accounts for these multiple sources
is the least specific distribution. Thus, the joint possibility distribution πx,y is:
πx,y = min(πx, πy).
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This is analogous to the principle of maximum entropy for probability theory.
For example, given x can take on values {x1, . . . , xn}, then without any knowledge on
the probability or possibility of x, then
P (x1) = . . . = P (xn) =
1
n
Π(x1) = . . . = Π(xn) = 1 .
In contrast to probability measures, possibility measures are not additive. Pos-
sibility measures are subadditive:
Π(A ∪B) ≤ Π(A) + Π(B).
Furthermore, a high possibility measure for an event does not imply a high probability
measure, and a low probability measure does not imply a low possibility. A theoretical
connection between probability and possibility exists [14]:
∀x, P (x) ≤ Π(x).
2.4.1.3 Evidence Theory. Evidence theory, which is often referred to
as Dempster-Shafer theory, is based on a mass function or mass distribution function
m(·). Given a frame of discernment, which is the set of hypotheses Θ = {θ1, . . . , θn},
and its power set 2Θ, which is the set of all possible subsets of Θ, a mass function
assigns a measure of uncertainty to each member of the power set. Following are some
properties of the mass function:





From this mass function, a belief in a subset A of Θ can be defined as the sum of the





Evidence theory can be thought of as a generalization of probability or pos-
sibility theory. Probability and possibility distributions have a corresponding mass
assignment which gives a belief function. Furthermore, one can think of belief func-
tions as a more tentative representation than probability distributions. In evidence
theory, a mass can be assigned to a set of hypotheses and updated as further infor-
mation is gathered.
There are multiple schools of interpretation of evidence theory. One school
thinks of evidence theory as a generalization of Bayesian subjective probability. This
school of thought believes evidence theory can be related to probability theory by the
following:
∀A, Bel(A) ≤ P (A).
In other words, the belief mass assigned to a hypothesis can never exceed its proba-
bility.
The second school of thought rejects the idea that evidence theory is related
to probability theory. This school of thought interprets evidence theory with the
transferable belief model. For this model, given any subset A of Θ, the belief mass
m(A) is the amount of belief assigned to A. This mass cannot be assigned to any
subset of A due to lack of knowledge. As evidence is obtained, subsets of A can be
excluded, and the original mass assigned to can be transferred to the remaining part
of A.
Finally, evidence theory can be used to accomplish decision analysis. There are
two possible means of using evidence theory for decision analysis. The first uses the
interval interpretation of evidence theory. This interpretation is that Bel(A) is a lower
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bound on the probability of A and Pl(A) is an upper bound for the probability of A,
where Pl(A) is the total belief mass that may ever be assigned to A (i.e., the extent
to which A might be true). Pl(A) is defined as the probability mass not supporting
¬A.
Pl(A) = 1−Bel(¬A)
The second uses the transferable belief model to convert a mass distribution to a
probability distribution. [14]
2.4.1.4 Other Uncertainty Models. Following are a few lesser used
uncertainty models.
Certainty Factors. Certainty factors, which have been used to handle uncer-
tainty, are based on rules of the form
IF evidence E
THEN hypothesis H.
Each hypothesis is characterized by two measures of uncertainty, MB and MD. MB
is the degree which the evidence supports the belief of the hypothesis, and MD is the






Although widely used, certainty factors are not without flaws. People have
challenged the independence assumptions and the evidence updating ability of the
model.
Fuzzy Sets. Fuzzy sets are a generalization of classical set theory. Fuzzy sets
aim to represent sets in which the boundaries of the set are not clear. Parsons, in [14],
uses the set of all animals as an example for fuzzy sets. Obviously, dogs and cats are
animals, but it is less clear whether bacteria and viruses are animals.
Some work was accomplished by Bonissone, et al. [3] in the late 1980s for com-
bining fuzzy sets with probabilities into fuzzy probabilities for use in a military ap-
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plication. These fuzzy probabilities were shown to be useful in accomplishing naval
and aerial situation assessment, where the goal is to detect, track and identify tar-
gets. Although useful for this military application, the applicability to EBO is not
obvious. In fact, Parsons states that fuzzy sets are used to model vague information
not uncertain information. [14]
Rough Sets. Rough sets are another generalization of classical set theory. Rough
sets model objects that cannot be categorized into one set or another. These objects
possess the qualities of being in the set, but also the qualities of being outside of the
set. Thus, Parsons states that rough sets can be used to model ambiguity. [14]
2.4.2 Uncertainty Computational Techniques. Having discussed the poten-
tial models for dealing with uncertainty, it is important to take a look at the techniques
used to manipulate these measures in order to arrive at useful information. These
techniques fall into two broad categories: quantitative and qualitative. The quan-
titative techniques require enumeration of all the required quantities; whereas, the
qualitative techniques use either strictly qualitative data or a mixture of qualitative
and quantitative data. Each type of technique has its benefits and drawbacks. The
quantitative techniques maintain a high level of precision, but require vast amounts of
data that is often times unattainable. On the other hand, the qualitative techniques
require less specific data but are much less precise. In fact, the qualitative techniques
can lead to no useful information being obtained due to lack of specificity. Thus, it
is imperative that a technique is chosen that will result in truly useful and attainable
data.
2.4.2.1 Quantitative Techniques. Quantitative techniques were devel-
oped to address the large number of probabilities required of probabilistic systems.
For example, given a system composed of n variables, to fully state the relationships
of the system, 2n probabilities are required. For many real world systems where n
is quite large, this becomes computationally prohibitive. Thus, several quantitative
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techniques were suggested in order to overcome the computationally intensive nature
of probability theory.
Causal Networks. Causal networks reduce the number of required probabilities/-
possibilities by only representing the linkages between variables that have an actual
causal relationship. These relationships are presented in a network model where the
nodes are the variables and the relationships between the variables are depicted with
arcs. Thus, a node is only connected with those nodes that directly affect it.
Although useful for reducing the number of computations, causal networks still
require that probabilities/possibilities be obtained for each of the relevant relation-
ships. Thus, for EBO, where linkages are sometimes vague or unknown, causal net-
works are limited in their ability to provide attainable answers (at least from a quan-
titative perspective).
Valuation Networks. Valuation networks are graphical representations of value-
based systems. These systems represent the entities of the system as variables and
the relationship between them as valuations. These valuations can be probability
distributions, possibility distributions or belief mass assignments. Once again, the
difficulty in using valuation networks for EBO is in the development of the respective
distributions for each of the interactions between variables. This is almost always not
possible due to the uncertainties of war.
Influence Diagrams. Influence diagrams, like causal networks, are a graphical
representation of the interactions between a set of variables. Influence diagrams were
developed as a decision analysis tool. Originally, in order to solve influence diagrams,
they needed to be transformed into some other form and then solved. However,
computational methods have been developed that evaluate influence diagrams. Prob-
ability distributions for the chance nodes and value structures for the value nodes are
required; both of which can be difficult to obtain for EBO.
2.4.2.2 Qualitative Methods. The major drawback to all of the quan-
titative methods is: “where are all the numbers coming from?” [14] This is definitely
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the major concern when considering the use of the quantitative methods for EBO.
The possible solutions are qualitative methods that use either partial quantitative
data or strictly qualitative information. These qualitative methods do not provide as
much detail as the quantitative models, but arrive at more robust results with much
less effort. [6]
Qualitative Reasoning. Qualitative reasoning uses the abstraction of real num-
bers into positive, negative, and zero valued quantities. This method has been used
widely to assess highly complex systems such as digital circuits and the human body.
Instead of trying to obtain numerical data regarding a system, qualitative reasoning
aims to identify the interesting features of system behavior. This method is useful in
assessing systems with complexity or ambiguity problems. The results are not very
detailed and for EBO would likely be ineffective.
An extension to qualitative reasoning aimed at reducing the level of abstraction
is order of magnitude systems. For these systems, the qualitative values are further
divided into orders of magnitude (i.e., A is negligible with respect to B, or A has
the same order of magnitude as B). Once again, for EBO purposes the system is too
coarse to be of much use.
Finally, qualitative algebras also seek to reduce the level of abstraction. Quali-
tative algebras use more quantitative information combined with the qualitative infor-
mation. The quantitative information is used as extensive as possible, then translated
into qualitative values. This makes it possible to gain more information than strictly
converting the quantitative values to qualitative values prior to reasoning. Yet again,
though, for EBO this method does not provide the fidelity of solution needed for
planning or analysis.
Interval-Based Systems. Interval-based systems aim to overcome a lack of knowl-
edge by relaxing the requirement for point values. These intervals, whether they are
probability or another measure, make the imprecision of information clear and intu-
itive. This makes them attractive for application to EBO. For interval-based systems,
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the upper probability of a hypothesis A is defined among the set S of probabilities of
A as:
P ∗(A) = sup
P∈S
P (A)




Thus, if A and B are disjoint events
P ∗(A ∪B) ≤ P ∗(A) + P ∗(B)
P∗(A ∪B) ≥ P∗(A) + P∗(B).
A specific approach of interval probabilities that may prove effective for EBO
is the use of interval probabilities to depict the linguistic quantifiers provided by
intelligence assessments. For example, the intelligence assessments of probable or
possible could be mapped to the intervals [a, b] and [b, c], where 0 < a ≤ b ≤ c < 1.
Abstraction of Quantitative Systems. Another technique that may be effective
in EBO planning and assessment is Wellman’s work using qualitative probabilistic
networks (QPN) for decision analysis. QPNs are constructed based on influence dia-
grams and Bayesian belief networks. The difference is that the relationships among
the variables are qualitative influences and synergies rather than precise probabilities,
which are, as already stated, hard to obtain. [20] [6]
These qualitative influences and synergies make QPNs attractive for EBO. For
example, given a desired effect, there may be several possible actions that can be taken
to obtain that effect. The exact relation among the actions and effects will most likely
not be attainable. However, a planner or intelligence analyst might be able to place
an influence, either positive, negative, or zero, on the action-effect relationship. In
addition, when multiple actions are considered, there might be synergies associated
with the multiple actions. These also are addressed in QPNs.
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A major drawback to QPNs is that in the basic model the variables are binary
(i.e., two possible states). As variables with more than two values are considered, the
concept becomes more complex. To account for this, Wellman suggests thinking of
the multiple values of a variable as two sets of higher and lower values, where higher
and lower are based on some defined order of the values. [14]
Defeasible Reasoning. Defeasible reasoning is reasoning where new information
can invalidate old conclusions. Some times it is necessary to make hypotheses to
account for incomplete information. As new information is obtained the hypotheses
are retracted. In doing this, the problem of inconsistent information is added to the
original problem of incomplete information. These methods are primarily used for
systems which the incomplete information is known to exist. [14] In EBO, there is
incomplete knowledge of how uncertain the information is. Thus, defeasible reasoning
would most likely not be effective for EBO planning and assessment.
2.5 Measuring Uncertainty
In order to maximize information gain through intelligence asset prioritization,
it is necessary to measure the uncertainty present in the system. Once a distribution
has been assigned to the current state of the system (or subsystem), a measure of
uncertainty for the distribution is needed. The uncertainty community has used two
measurements of uncertainty to quantify the uncertainty associated with probability
and possibility distributions. Shannon’s entropy is the commonly used measure of un-
certainty used for probabilities, and specificity is used to measure the uncertainty for
possibility distributions. The entropy of a random variable measures its complexity,
or degree of randomness. Given a higher entropy of a random variable, it is harder to
predict the value of the random variable. [7] Specificity is an extension of Shannon’s
entropy to possibility distributions.
2.5.1 Shannon’s Entropy. Shannon’s entropy was developed in 1948 by
Claude E. Shannon during his research on information theory. Shannon was con-
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cerned with the amount of information, or bandwidth, that could be passed by com-
munication systems. Shannon’s work was the basis for much of the work on data
compression used in today’s internet. Shannon developed a logarithmic measure to
quantify the uncertainty associated with a discrete channel communication system





pi log2 pi (2.1)
where K is a positive constant and pi are transition probabilities from the current
state to the n possible states. Shannon also developed a continuous measure for
use with signals or messages that are continuously variable. Following is Shannon’s





p (x1, . . . , xn) log2p (x1, . . . , xn) dx1 · · · dxn. (2.2)
2.5.1.1 Shannon’s Entropy - Discrete Distributions. Suppose we are
given n possible discrete events with known probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pn. Shannon
states that if a measure of uncertainty, H, exists for the n events then it must have
the following properties. [16]
1. H should be continuous in the pi.
2. If all the pi are equal, pi =
1
n
, then H should be a monotonic increas-
ing function of n. With equally likely events there is more choice, or
uncertainty, when there are more possible events.
3. If a choice be broken down into two successive choices (see Fig-
ure 2.3 on the following page), the original H should be the weighted



























Shannon presents the following result with proof. [16]



























Figure 2.3: Entropy for Multiple Decision Points
where K is a positive constant.
The constant K is a matter of choice and is simply a unit of measure. K
can be any positive value and is chosen based on application. For example, if one






This results in a measure called relative entropy. [16] By normalizing the entropy, the
effect of the number of possible states, n, is removed. For this thesis, K is assumed
to equal 1
log2 n
due to the need to compare the entropy of nodes with different values
of n (i.e., with different number of states). For example, given a SoSA network where
the most important node is represented by two states and the least important node
is represented by three states, if no information is known regarding the current state
of each node, then the Shannon entropy of each (using Equation (2.1) with K = 1) is














































































Figure 2.4: Entropy (K = 1) Versus Relative Entropy (K = 1
log2 n
)
If a node is then chosen for intelligence collection, one would choose the more uncertain
node–the one with the highest entropy. In this case, it would be the least important
node.
The effect of n is depicted in Figure 2.4. On the left side of the figure is a plot
of (discrete) probability p versus entropy for various values of n. A system achieves
its highest entropy value at p = 1
n
; however, this highest value does not remain
constant, but grows logarithmically with n. On the right side of Figure 2.4, a plot of
p versus relative (or normalized) entropy for various values of n is given. Again, the
system achieves its highest entropy value at p = 1
n
, but this value is a constant of one
regardless of the possible number of states, n.
The base of the logarithm corresponds to the choice of a unit for the measure-
ment. Base 2 corresponds to binary digits, or bits. Base 2 relates the number of
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Figure 2.5: Entropy, H, as a Function of p For the Binary Case [16]
in decimal digits. In the uncertainty community, base 2 (bits) is predominantly used
(presumably due to the community’s close ties to information theory).
Consider the binary system where two mutually exclusive events are possible,
with probabilities p and q = 1− p. Thus, the entropy of the system is
H = − (p log2 p + q log2 q) .
The entropy for this system is plotted as a function of p in Figure 2.5. Note, the
maximum entropy is attained when p = q = 0.5. This corresponds to the values of p
and q for which the least information (or maximum uncertainty) is known regarding
the outcome of the system. Furthermore, minimum entropy is attained when either
event is known to occur with probability 1, p = 1 or q = 1. This corresponds to
perfect information (or no uncertainty) regarding the outcome of the system.
Next, consider the case where there are eight possible mutually exclusive events.
Given a node, ni, let Ni be the state of ni. Ni is a discrete random variable defined
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Figure 2.6: Discrete Distributions with Varying Uncertainties
on a finite set with an associated probability distribution, pi, where pi(x) = P (Ni =
x). Under total uncertainty, one cannot say that any one state is more probable
than another state. Thus, based on the principle of maximum entropy, one has to
assume a uniform distribution for the eight discrete states. [14] No uncertainty, or total
certainty, implies that the random variable is known to equal a single state. Thus, all
pi(x) equal zero except for one, which equals one. In between total uncertainty and
total certainty, Shannon’s relative entropy results in a measure of the varying levels
of uncertainty.
To illustrate, consider the distributions presented in Figure 2.6. Now, using
Shannon’s relative entropy for discrete probability distributions (Equation (2.1)), we
arrive at a measure for the uncertainty of each of these distributions. For A, the total
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uncertainty case, the relative entropy is:




pi (x) log2 pi (x)
= −1
3
[0.125× 8 (log2 0.125)]
= 1.
For B, the no certainty case, the relative entropy is:









and for C, the case in between total and no uncertainty, the relative entropy is:




pi (x) log2 pi (x)
= −1
3
[0.125× 4 (log2 0.125) + 0.5 (log2 0.5)]
= 0.667.
Entropy has some interesting properties that further substantiate it as a valid
measure of uncertainty. [16]
1. H is not dependent upon the values of X. It is only dependent upon the
probabilities, P (X = x).
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2. H = 0 if and only if all pi equal 0 except one, which equals 1. Thus, only when





= −1 log2 (1)
= 0






















Thus, the maximum H increases as the possible number of events increases.
This is intuitive as the number of possible events increases so too does the
uncertainty associated with the system.
4. Given two events, x and y. The entropy of the joint event is
H (x, y) = −
∑
i,j
p (i, j) log2 p (i, j)
where
H (x) = −
∑
i,j




H (y) = −
∑
i,j





Thus, the entropy of the joint event is less than or equal to the sum of the
individual entropies.
H (x, y) ≤ H (x) + H (y) .
If the events x and y are independent, then
H (x, y) = H (x) + H (y) .
5. Any change toward equalization of the probabilities p1, . . . , pn increases H.
This property is demonstrated for the binary case in Figure 2.5 on page 29, and
can be easily shown for other n.
2.6 Linguistic Quantifiers
In EBO, it is necessary to develop a methodology for describing the current
states of the individual nodes and the overall network. The sources for characteriz-
ing the current states of the nodes and the network are intelligence data. This data
is often times not exact, and as such contains much uncertainty. If an intelligence
analyst provides a probability for the current state, then these probabilities can be
plugged directly into the network. However, if an intelligence analyst provides lin-
guistic quantifiers, then assigning a probability, possibility or belief to the current
state of a node can be accomplished several different ways. However, for the goal
of quantifying the uncertainty present in the assessment, some techniques are more
acceptable than others.
Intelligence data usually makes use of linguistic quantifiers, or “words of estima-
tive probability.” For example, an intelligence analyst may give the precise location
of an airfield, but may provide a judgement or estimate of the use of the airfield (i.e.,
“It is almost certainly a military airfield”). It is this linguistic estimate that is the
source of the probabilistic uncertainty. [11]
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Table 2.1: Sherman Kent’s Words of Estimative Probability [11]














50-50 chances about even




Probably Not we believe that . . . not
we estimate that . . . not
we doubt, doubtful




Kent [11] provides a list of linguistic quantifiers commonly used by intelligence
analysts. This list is definitely not all inclusive but provides a good unclassified
framework. Kent’s list of synonyms is presented in Table 2.1. Kent also presents a
suggestion for translating these linguistic quantifiers to probabilities (see Table 2.2 on
the following page).
In dealing with Kent’s interval probabilities, the idea of maximum entropy is
quite useful. The principle of maximum entropy can be used to obtain a point es-
timate for a probability interval. If given a probability interval, [a, b], for an event
for which the distribution across the interval is unknown, the principle of maximum
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Table 2.2: Kent’s Probabilities Associated with Linguistic Quantifiers [11]
Probability Linguistic Quantifier
100 % Certainty
93 % ± 6 % Almost certain
75 % ± 12 % Probable
50 % ± 10 % Chances about even
30 % ± 10 % Probably not
7 % ± 5 % Almost certainly not
0% Impossibility
entropy distributes the probabilities equally across the interval (i.e., uniform distri-
bution). According to Jaynes, this is the “least biased estimate possible based on the
given information.” [9] Thus, no single probability is more favored than any other.
Therefore, the expected value for the interval, based on the principle of maximum
entropy, is the midpoint of the interval 1/2 · (a + b). [14]
This thesis uses the midpoint of Kent’s interval probabilities as a point estimate
for the discrete probabilities assigned to the linguistic quantifiers. As an example,
given an eight-state node, the probability distribution for Probably Not in state 5 is
depicted in Figure 2.7 on the next page.
P (Ni = ¬5) = 0.70
2.7 Generalized Assignment Problem
The allocation of intelligence collection efforts from multiple intelligence sources
against multiple nodes can be related to the integer program (IP) of assigning multiple
resources to multiple containers, or knapsacks–the multiple knapsack problem. The
multiple knapsack problem takes the form of m containers with ci capacities and n
items with profits pj. It makes use of a binary indicator variable xij, that takes value 1

























wjxij ≤ ci, i = 1, . . . ,m, (2.4)
m∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1, j = 1, . . . , n, (2.5)
xij = 0 or 1, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n. (2.6)
Equation (2.4) are the capacity constraints for the knapsacks, and Equation (2.5)
ensures that item j is only added to a knapsack once.
In the objective function, Equation (2.3), the profit pj is the profit (or benefit)
obtained by adding item j to a knapsack. For the multiple knapsack problem, this
value is a constant independent of the knapsack selected. For application to the in-
telligence asset allocation problem, the information gained (i.e., benefit) is dependent
upon the intelligence asset selected to collect the information. Therefore, the GAP
must be used to solve the allocation problem. Strictly speaking, the GAP is not a
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knapsack problem, but the algorithms used to solve it use the knapsack subprob-
lems. [12]
The GAP can be formulated using the terminology of knapsack problems. Given
n items and m knapsacks, with
pij = profit of item j if assigned to knapsack i,
wij = weight of item j if assigned to knapsack i,
ci = capacity of knapsack i,
maximize the total profit by assigning each item to at most one knapsack without










wijxij ≤ ci, i = 1, . . . ,m, (2.8)
m∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1, j = 1, . . . , n, (2.9)
xij = 0 or 1, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n. (2.10)
2.8 Chapter 2 Review
This chapter provided a review of the current literature on EBO, knowledge
uncertainty, linguistic quantifiers, methods for handling uncertainty, uncertainty mea-
sures, and the GAP. In Chapter 3, probability theory is used to represent the uncer-
tainty associated with the nodes of the SoSA network. This uncertainty is measured
with Shannon’s relative entropy, and the GAP is used to allocate intelligence resources




This chapter presents a mathematical model for System-of-systems Analysis
(SoSA) networks, a methodology for prioritizing a single intelligence asset’s collec-
tion efforts, and a methodology for allocating multiple intelligence assets. The SoSA
mathematical model is intended as a general state model which may be used for
other applications dealing with SoSA. It defines notation and terminology and forms
the foundation for the later methodologies for prioritizing and allocating intelligence
collection efforts. The methodology for prioritizing a single asset’s intelligence col-
lection efforts uses Shannon’s entropy [16] to measure the current uncertainty of the
nodal states. This uncertainty is based on the latest intelligence assessments, which
are typically provided using linguistic quantifiers, and the planned actions against
the nodes. The expected reduction in entropy due to an intelligence collection effort
is then calculated. Finally, intelligence collection efforts are selected based on the
greatest possible reduction in uncertainty. This methodology is then extended to the
allocation of multiple intelligence assets. A generalized assignment problem is used
to maximize the amount of information gain from a limited number of intelligence
collection opportunities.
3.2 SoSA Network Mathematical Model
According to the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) Pamphlet 7 on Effects-based
Operations (EBO), a SoSA is accomplished in order to gain further understanding
and situational awareness of an adversary and the operational environment. To ac-
complish a SoSA, the operational environment is assumed to be composed of politi-
cal, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) entities (or
systems). These six interrelated PMESII systems are represented pictorially using
a multi-dimensional network. Each node within the network represents a person,
place, or physical thing that is a fundamental component of the system. The linkages
connecting the nodes represent the behavioral, physical, or functional relationships
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JWFC Doctrine Pam 7 
17 November 2004 
10
 The ONA process begins when the combatant commander 
designates a priority (specific nation, region, contingency, or entity) within 
the AOR. The initial “baseline” ONA effort for a specific priority is to develop 
a system-of-systems analysis (SoSA)—an important sub-process of ONA—which 
populates the baseline ONA with data on PMESII systems and their organization, 
characteristics, and relationships.  This effort produces a nodal analysis which, 
along with effects development, forms the basis for coupling nodes to effects, 
actions to nodes, and resources to established E-N-A linkages.  Secondary and 
unintended effects also are considered during this process.  Joint force planners use 
this database—updated when a crisis is imminent—to develop, compare, and 
recommend effects-based COAs for the JFC’s decision. 
 As Figure 3 depicts, SoSA emphasizes a multi-dimensional approach toward 
understanding the battlespace, characterized by an analysis of six interrelated PMESII 
systems. Within each of these systems are nodes (a person, place, or physical thing 
that is a fundamental component of a system) and links (the behavioral, physical, or 
functional relationship between the nodes).  SoSA identifies the relationship between 
nodes within individual systems and 
across systems.  These nodes and 
associated links are then identified for 
DIME actions to influence or change 
system behavior and capabilities in 
order to achieve desired objectives. 
Understanding each of these 
systems and their interrelationships 
enables a holistic perspective of the 
operational environment.  Among 
other benefits, this perspective helps 
intelligence analysts identify potential 
sources from which to gain 
indications and warning and allows 
planners to consider a broader set of 
options to achieve objectives and 
focus limited resources.  It also 
increases the understanding of how 
individual actions on one element of 
the system can affect other 
interrelated system components.
 Both the SoSA and the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) 
are complementary processes that produce the awareness and understanding required 
to plan and execute EBO.  While JIPB doctrine provides for a broader perspective, JIPB 
activities generally have focused on the adversary’s military.  SoSA is intended to 
provide a comprehensive analysis across all PMESII systems.  The SoSA is a valuable  
FIGURE 3:  SYSTEM-OF-SYSTEMS 
Analyze the battlespace as a “system of 
systems.”
Understand the connectivity of key systems, 
nodes and links.
Identify decisive points for action to 









Figure 3.1: Systems-of-systems Analysis [10]
between the nodes. By developing an interrelated network of a region or nation of
interest, planners aim to take a holistic view of the operational environment. See
Figure 3.1 for a pictorial representation of a SoSA network. [10]
In order to mathematically represent the SoSA network, the following notation
is introduced. Let node i represent the smallest, non-decomposable entity or node in
the network (or at least at the highest resolution that one intends to represent the
network). Let ni denote the node, where i is a unique identifier for the node (i ∈ N+).
Thus a SoSA network composed of k entities can be represented by the set of nodes,
N .
N = {n1, n2, . . . , nk}
However, to fully characterize the network we must describe the current state
of the k nodes, as well as the linkages and possible relationships among the states of
the nodes. To describe the current state of a node, let Ni be defined as the current
state of ni. Ni may be composed of multiple characteristics or qualities associated
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For EBO, these attributes will usually be assessed using linguistic quantifiers provided
from intelligence (e.g., an enemy system could be defined as operational, degraded,
nonoperational, etc.).
For example, a node, na, may possess physical, functional, and behavioral at-
tributes. Then the current state is
Na =
[








a is the physical state of the node, N
(2)
a is the functional state of the node,
and N
(3)
a is the behavioral state of the node.






# of possible linguistic quantifiers for N (z)a
]
.
Let Ui be the set of all discrete states for ni.
Back to our example, assume each of the three attributes can be rated as follows
N (z)a =
 0 , if nonactive1 , if active.
Then na can be in any one of 2
3 = 8 unique states.
For a SoSA network composed of k nodes, let C denote the set of current state
vectors for the k nodes within the network (N ).






Figure 3.2: Multiple parent and child nodes
At this point, it must be noted that this notation describes a static network. If
one is considering a dynamic network, the notation can easily be adapted to account
for time. To accomplish this, let Ni(t) be the state vector for node ni at time t.
Next, notation is introduced for the linkages between nodes. Given two nodes,
ni and nj, the linkage, lij, between states Ni and Nj denotes the existence of a
relationship between the node states. This linkage, lij, can be unknown or directed.
The unknown linkage arises when a relationship between the states Ni and Nj is known
to exist, but quantifying, or even qualifying, the relation is not possible. The directed
linkage exists when the state Nj is dependent upon the state Ni. For the directed
linkage, the independent node is referred to as the parent node, and the dependent
node is referred to as the child node. [5] [Note, the parent/child terminology only
depicts a directed relation between two nodes. For EBO, no hierarchy or ownership is
implied by the terminology. To say a node ni is a parent to node nj only indicates the
state Ni has an influence on the state Nj.] A node may possess one or more parent
or child nodes (see Figure 3.2). Thus, for any two nodes, ni and nj, i 6= j, there
exists no relationship, an unknown relationship, or a directed relationship between
their associated states, Ni and Nj. See Figure 3.3 on the following page.
To complete the directed graph terminology, the terms directed path, ancestor,













Figure 3.4: Linkage between ni and nj
if there exists directed linkages from node ni to node nk. For example, in Figure 3.2 on
the page before, a directed path exists from node nf to node nj (i.e., lfi from node
nf to node ni and lij from node ni to node nj). If a directed path exists from node
nf to nj, then node nf is called an ancestor of node nj, and nj is referred to as a
descendant of node nf . [21]
It is important to note that linkages can occur in both directions between two
nodes, ni and nj. In other words, there may exist an interdependence between the
state Ni and the state Nj. To account for this, let lij denote the relationship from Ni
to Nj, and lji denote the relationship from Nj to Ni (see Figure 3.4). If no relationship





0 , if no relation exists between ni and nj
1 , if a directed relation exists between ni and nj
[?] , if an unknown relation exists between ni and nj.
For a SoSA network composed of k nodes, let L denote the set of non-zero
linkages between the k nodes. In other words, L denotes the set of all existing linkages
between the k nodes.
L = {lij : lij 6= 0, i, j ∈ [1, k] , i 6= j}
L can also be represented using a k × k adjacency matrix, where the elements
of the matrix, lij, represent linkages from node ni to node nj. In other words, the
rows of L represent the parent nodes, and the columns represent the child nodes. For
example, the adjacency matrix for Figure 3.2 on page 41 is
L =

0 lfg lfh lfi lfj lfk
lgf 0 lgh lgi lgj lgk
lhf lhg 0 lhi lhj lhk
lif lig lih 0 lij lik
ljf ljg ljh lji 0 ljk





0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 [?]
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 [?] 0 0

.
Note, due to the unknown linkage between node ni and node nk, lik = lki = [?]. This
holds for any unknown linkage.
Using the adjacency matrix, one can easily identify the linkages associated with
a node. For example, row 1 indicates node nf is a parent only to node ni, and column
1 indicates nf is not a child to any node.
Each existing linkage, lij 6= 0, may possess a function (or mapping) of the state
of ni, Ni, to the state of nj, Nj. Let Lij denote this function (or mapping).
Lij (Ni) = Nj
Lij may be quantitative or qualitative. A quantitative function (or mapping) exists if
numerical data exist to relate the state Ni to the state Nj. In the absence of complete
numerical data (i.e., partial numerical data or complete lack of numerical data), a
qualitative mapping may exist. This mapping relates the state Ni to the state Nj by
qualitatively describing the effect the state Ni has on state Nj. For example, given
a positive (+) change in the state Ni, Lij may qualitatively relate this change to
a positive (+) or negative (−) change in the state Nj. Without more information,
nothing more can be stated regarding the change in state Nj based on a change in




Taking a closer look at the linkages between the states of nodes, one can see that
some attributes of a node may be more influential on child attributes than others.
Whereas some attributes may have no influence on the state of the child node. To
account for this, Lij may be composed of individual attribute functions (or mappings)





























Next, because each node, nj, may possess more than one parent and thus more than
one state mapped to its state, Nj, notation must be introduced to relate the pj possible
linkages, where pj is defined as the number of parents to nj. See Figure 3.5 on the
following page. Also, it is possible there exist linkages between the pj parent nodes.
Thus, any mapping (or function) relating the pj parent nodes to the state Nj must
also take into account the linkages between the states of the parent nodes. Let fj be
the function that relates all the current states of the pj parent nodes and the linkages
among the parent nodes to the current state Nj.
Nj = fj [Nd, Ne, . . . , Nr, Lde, Ldf , . . .]
For a SoSA network composed of k nodes, let F denote the set of functions (or
mappings) associated with the non-zero linkages between the k nodes.
F = {Lij, fj : lij 6= 0, i, j ∈ [1, k] , i 6= j}
Thus, an entire SoSA network, A, is completely characterized by the nodes







Figure 3.5: Node nj with pj parents
functions relating the states of the nodes (F).
A = {N ,S,L,F}
In addition, the graphical model of the SoSA network, G, can be entirely represented
using N and L
G = (N ,L)
and the state model, S, can be entirely represented using C and F .
S = (C,F)
To allow planners to abstract or aggregate the network to the appropriately
needed level, the concept of a system is introduced. A system, denoted n[i], is defined
as a non-empty set of nodes and/or systems, current state vectors, linkages, and
functions, which acts as a single entity.









Figure 3.6: System notation
where, N ′ ⊆ N , C ′ ⊆ C, L′ ⊆ L, F ′ ⊆ F . This notation allows one to represent
complex systems as single nodes. In Figure 3.6, na, nb, nc, and their associated
linkages are replaced with n[e].
As an example of a system, consider a surface-to-air missile (SAM) battalion
within an enemy integrated air defense system (IADS). Planners may not desire to or
may not be able to assess the current states of individual components of the SAM bat-
talion (e.g., acquisition radar, tracking radar, command vehicle, transporter erector
launcher (TEL). Thus, to represent the battalion within the network, the individual
components, as well as their associated linkages, are encompassed in a system node,
n[i]. Planners can now define effects and actions in terms of the system, n[i], instead
of each of the individual components.
3.3 Prioritizing A Single Intelligence Asset’s Collection Efforts Based
on Nodal Uncertainty
Given a mathematical model of the SoSA network, a methodology for priori-
tizing a single intelligence asset’s collection efforts is developed. At first brush, one
might decide to simply choose the most uncertain node (or nodes) (i.e., highest en-
tropy) and task an asset to collect intelligence on it. However, the possible reduction
in entropy due to an intelligence collection effort is dependent upon the intelligence
asset available as well as the target node. For example, imagery intelligence (IMINT)
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may be very effective in assessing the current state of a tank or Army brigade but
may provide little to no information on the current state of a political party or regime.
Thus, any model developed must account for the dependence between an intelligence
asset and target types. Presented below is a model that maximizes the information
gain (i.e., the reduction in entropy) while accounting for the dependence between
assets and targets.
3.3.1 Overall Model. The overall approach to prioritizing the intelligence
(information) collection effort is:
1. Based upon current intelligence assessments, calculate the uncertainty associ-













′′ = the probability that node i is in state l, Ni = l, adjusted for the
freshness of the intelligence update and planned actions on ni.
2. Next, based on the available intelligence asset, the expected entropy given an
intelligence information collection effort on each node, E [hi
′], is calculated. For
these calculations, the states of the nodes are assumed to be independent. The
expected change in entropy for node ni, δi, is
δi = ρi (hi − E [h′i]) (3.2)
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Table 3.1: Kent’s Probabilities Associated with Linguistic Quantifiers [11]
Probability Linguistic Quantifier
100 % Certainty
93 % ± 6 % Almost certain
75 % ± 12 % Probable
50 % ± 10 % Chances about even
30 % ± 10 % Probably not
7 % ± 5 % Almost certainly not
0% Impossibility
where ρi is a weighting factor for ni based on the previously determined nodal
priority (i.e., Priority I, Priority II, etc.). Refer to Section 3.3.2 for a discussion
on nodal priorities.
3. Finally, intelligence collection efforts are selected based on the maximum δi.
Given a m-node SoSA network, let pi be defined as the prior probability dis-









This prior probability distribution is based upon the latest intelligence assessment on
ni. Using Kent’s [11] mapping of linguistic quantifiers to probabilities (see Table 3.1),
discrete probability distributions are assigned to the states of the nodes. This thesis
uses the midpoint of Kent’s intervals as point estimates for the linguistic quantifiers.
If an intelligence assessment only provides information on a single state of the node
(i.e., Ni is almost certainly in state 0), Kent’s mapping is used to assign a probability
mass to that state. Because no further information is given regarding the remaining
states, the unassigned probability mass is evenly distributed to the remaining states
based on the principle of maximum entropy.
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This prior probability distribution is then adjusted based on the freshness of
the intelligence assessment. The need to adjust the prior probability distribution is
due to the dynamic nature of the nodal states. As time progresses since the last
intelligence update, the uncertainty in the prior probability distribution may grow.
The prior probability distribution can erode toward total uncertainty dependent upon
the amount of time since the last intelligence assessment. Intelligence collection efforts
will need to be directed more often at the nodes that change state more frequently

















where ωi is the erosion factor of the prior probability distribution for ni. ωi is chosen
based on an assessment of how frequently Ni will possibly change states. Although
other weighting schemes exist for ωi, a straight-forward method is to make ωi inversely




where ti is the amount of time since the last intelligence update on ni. The units of ti
may be defined differently for different nodes. Some nodes will possibly change state
more frequently than others requiring the units of ti to be hours or days, whereas
others that remain static (assuming no action is taken against the nodes) for longer
periods of time may require the units of ti to be weeks or even months. For example, a
electrical power plant will likely remain in a constant state unless acted upon. Thus,
required intelligence collection efforts will be needed less frequently. On the other
extreme, a political regime may change states often resulting in frequently needed
intelligence updates.
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To illustrate, consider a Priority 1 node, n1, where
N1 =

0 if n1 is nonoperational
1 if n1 is degraded
2 if n1 is operational .
Based on the latest intelligence assessment given one day prior, n1 was assessed to be












(0.035 log2(0.035) + 0.035 log2(0.035) + 0.93 log2(0.93))
= 0.275.
If N1 is assessed to possibly change state daily (i.e., the units of t1 are days) and the



















The relative entropy of p1




(0.035 log2(0.035) + 0.035 log2(0.035) + 0.93 log2(0.93))
= 0.275.
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The relative entropy of p1




(0.2339 log2(0.2339) + 0.2339 log2(0.2339) + 0.5322 log2(0.5322))
= 0.9242.
Therefore, given the assessment was given three days later, the prior probability
distribution was updated resulting in more uncertainty.
After the prior probability distribution has been updated based on the time
since the last intelligence update, it is necessary to update this distribution based
on actions taken against the node since the last intelligence update, or planned prior
to the next intelligence collection opportunity. Currently in operations, intelligence
assets are tasked to collect information on lots of targets for which actions have been
taken. This is a plausible allocation of intelligence assets if the action against a node
has a low or unknown probability of success. There is a valid need to verify the effect
of the action. However, given a high probability action against a node, it may be less
vital to verify the effect of the action of the node. The following updating scheme
updates the prior probability distribution based on an action’s probability of success
and estimated posterior probability distribution.
Given pi
′ and a set of actions against a subset of N , the pi′’s need to be updated
based on the probability of success of the actions, αi, and the estimated posterior
probability distributions based on these actions, pi
α. αi and pi
α may be obtained
from previous real world data or by subject matter expert (SME) assessments. The
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prior probability distribution updated for actions is
pi
′′ = (1− αi) pi′ + (αi) piα. (3.4)
If no action is executed or planned against ni, then αi = 0 and pi
′ = pi
′′.
Continuing with the example from above, prior to the next intelligence collection
opportunity an action is planned against n1. It is estimated the action will change


























The new relative entropy given p1
′′ is
h1 = 0.8276.
Once the prior probability distributions have been updated based on the timing
of the latest intelligence assessments and the planned actions, E [hi
′] is calculated next.
In order to calculate E [hi
′], estimates for the effectiveness of the intelligence asset
against ni must be obtained. Specifically, estimates for intelligence asset effectiveness
against each state of each node must be obtained. For example, an asset may be
very effective at assessing operational if the node is in an operational state but only
marginally capable of assessing nonoperational if the same node is in a nonoperational
state. These estimates may be obtained from previous real world data or by SME
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assessments. The needed estimates are
P {asset indicates Ni = a|Ni = a} , ∀ni ∈ N , a ∈ Ui
where Ui is the set of discrete states for ni.
For the example from above, the available intelligence asset is assessed to possess
the following effectiveness against n1.
P {asset indicates N1 = 0|N1 = 0} = 0.95
P {asset indicates N1 = 1|N1 = 1} = 0.75
P {asset indicates N1 = 2|N1 = 2} = 0.75
and, thus
P {asset indicates N1 6= 0|N1 = 0} = 0.05
P {asset indicates N1 6= 1|N1 = 1} = 0.25
P {asset indicates N1 6= 2|Ni = 2} = 0.25.
Note, not all the required probabilities are given above. Using the principle of maxi-
mum entropy, the probability mass associated with P {asset indicates Ni 6= a|Ni = a}
is uniformly distributed among the remaining states.
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Figure 3.7: Decomposition of an Intelligence Collection Effort on n1




Figure 3.7 depicts the decomposition of an intelligence collection effort on ni.
Using the estimates for the asset effectiveness, P {asset indicates Ni = a} is calculated
using the Law of Total Probability.
P {asset indicates Ni = a} =
u∑
l=1
P {asset indicates Ni = a|Ni = l}P {Ni = l}
(3.5)
where P {Ni = l} is based on the updated prior probability distribution, pi′′. Thus,
for the example from above
P {asset indicates N1 = 0} = P {asset indicates N1 = 0|N1 = 0}P {N1 = 0}+
P {asset indicates N1 = 0|N1 = 1}P {N1 = 1}+
P {asset indicates N1 = 0|N1 = 2}P {N1 = 2}




P {asset indicates N1 = 1} = 0.21665
P {asset indicates N1 = 2} = 0.1460.
From this, for all b, c ∈ Ui, P {Ni = b|asset indicates Ni = c} follows using
Bayes’ Theorem.
P {Ni = b|asset indicates Ni = c} =
P {Ni = b ∩ asset indicates Ni = c}
P {asset indicates Ni = c}
=
P {asset indicates Ni = c|Ni = b}P {Ni = b}
P {asset indicates Ni = c}
(3.6)
Thus, for the example
P {N1 = 0|asset indicates N1 = 0} =
P {asset indicates N1 = 0|N1 = 0}P {N1 = 0}






P {N1 = 1|asset indicates N1 = 0} = 0.0482
P {N1 = 2|asset indicates N1 = 0} = 0.0261
P {N1 = 0|asset indicates N1 = 1} = 0.0717
P {N1 = 1|asset indicates N1 = 1} = 0.8516
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P {N1 = 2|asset indicates N1 = 1} = 0.0767
P {N1 = 0|asset indicates N1 = 2} = 0.1063
P {N1 = 1|asset indicates N1 = 2} = 0.2106







P {asset indicates Ni = j}hasset indicates Ni=ji (3.7)
where hasset indicates Ni=0i is the entropy of ni given the asset indicates Ni = a (i.e., the
entropy of each branch of Figure 3.7. Thus,
hasset indicates N1=01 = −
1
log (3)
(0.9257 log(0.9257) + 0.0482 log(0.0482) + 0.0261 log(0.0261))
= 0.2847
hasset indicates N1=11 = −
1
log (3)
(0.0717 log(0.0717) + 0.8516 log(0.8516) + 0.0767 log(0.0767))
= 0.4758
hasset indicates N1=21 = −
1
log (3)


















= (0.6373) (0.2847) + (0.21665) (0.4758) + (0.1460) (0.7525)
= 0.3944.
Next, the weighted change in entropy is calculated.
δi = ρi (hi − E [hi′]) (3.8)
Thus,
δ1 = ρ1 (h1 − E [h1′])
= (8) (0.8276− 0.3944)
= 3.4656.
Finally, the maximum δi is selected. For the example above, only one node was
examined. If multiple nodes were analyzed, the node corresponding to the maximum
δi would be selected for the intelligence asset effort. Section 3.3.3 demonstrates a
three-node example for a single intelligence asset.
In summary, based on a single intelligence asset, the methodology for selecting
intelligence collection efforts is composed of the following steps. For all nodes ni in
the SoSA network (i = 1, . . . , ui)
1. Establish the prior probability distributions
(a) Based on latest intelligence assessments (pi)
(b) Adjust based on the freshness of the intelligence assessments (pi
′)
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(c) Update based on planned action’s estimated probability of success and
posterior probability distributions (pi
′′)
2. Calculate the current entropy, hi
3. Calculate the expected entropy based on the estimated intelligence asset effec-
tiveness (E [hi
′])
(a) Calculate P {asset indicates Ni = a}
(b) Calculate P {Ni = b|asset indicates Ni = a}
(c) Calculate hasset indicates Ni=ai
(d) Calculate E [hi
′]
4. Calculate δi
5. Select node corresponding to maximum δi
3.3.2 Nodal Priority. Based on strategic and/or operational objectives, the
nodes of the SoSA network possess different priorities. To incorporate nodal priorities
into the model presented in Section 3.3.1, the different priorities are simply assigned
weights, ρi. Figure 3.8 on page 61 depicts the expected change in entropy given
an intelligence collection effort, δi, for three weighting schemes for different priority
nodes (e.g., Priority 1, Priority 2, Priority 3 ). The graphs were constructed using
Matlabr -generated random numbers from [0, 1] to simulate possible expected changes
in relative entropy. These random numbers were assigned to sixty nodes–20 Priority
1, 20 Priority 2, and 20 Priority 3. The nodes with higher δi’s would be selected for
intelligence collection efforts.
The top graph shows equal priority weighting for each node type (i.e., ρi = 1).
If a limited number of intelligence collection efforts from a single asset was available,
then a quick look at the higher δi’s indicates the nodes that would be selected for
intelligence collection. The middle and bottom graphs show unequal weights for the
priority types with the higher priority nodes weighted more heavily. These schemes
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successfully differentiate the δi’s based on nodal priority. The higher δi’s are composed
predominantly of Priority 1 nodes with only the highest Priority 2 nodes near the
top.
3.3.3 Three-Node Example. To illustrate the methodology for prioritizing
the collection efforts of a single intelligence asset, consider a three-node network com-
posed of two binary-state nodes and one three-state node,
N1 =
 01 N2 =






Nodes n1 and n3 are Priority 1, and n2 is a Priority 2 node. According to planner
assessments, Priority 1 nodes should be weighted twice as much as Priority 2 nodes.
Thus, ρ1 = ρ3 = 2 and ρ2 = 1.
Available is one intelligence collection effort from an intelligence asset possessing
the estimated effectiveness against the nodes listed in Table 3.2 on page 62. Note, not
all required probabilities are given in Table 3.2. The principle of maximum entropy
is used to obtain the remaining effectiveness estimates. For example,
P {asset indicates N3 = 0|N3 = 0} = 0.95
P {asset indicates N3 = 0|N3 6= 0} = 0.05.
Thus, using the principle of maximum entropy,








Intelligence assessments for the current nodal states, as well as the freshness of






































































Priority 1 (ρ=8) Priority 2 (ρ=4) Priority 3 (ρ=1)
Figure 3.8: Various Priority Weighting Schemes
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Table 3.2: Three-node Example: Estimates for Intelligence Asset Effectiveness
ni Priority Ni = a Asset Effectiveness P {asset indicates Ni = a|Ni = a}
1 1 0 Not Effective 0.50
1 Marginally Effective 0.75
2 2 0 Effective 0.95
1 Marginally Effective 0.75
3 1 0 Effective 0.95
1 Marginally Effective 0.75
2 Not Effective 0.33
Table 3.3: Three-node Example: Prior Intelligence Assessment
Node (ni) Intelligence Assessment Days Prior (ti) pi















Table 3.4: Three-node Example: Actions Against ni
Node (ni) Estimated Probability Estimated Posterior












Using Equation (3.3), the prior probability distributions are updated based on












































Actions are planned against two of the nodes, n2 and n3. The estimated prob-
abilities of success and estimated posterior probability distributions are presented in
Table 3.4.
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Using Equation (3.4), pi
′ is updated with the expected probability distributions








































Nodes n1 and n2 can be in two discrete states, and n3 has three discrete states.
Thus, for Shannon’s relative entropy,








Using Equation (3.1), the current entropies of the probability distributions are
h1 = − (0.375 log2 0.375 + 0.625 log2 0.625)
= 0.9544





(0.035 log2 0.035 + 0.215 log2 0.215 + 0.750 log2 0.750)
= 0.6040.
From the estimates for asset effectiveness and the prior probability distribu-
tions, the P {asset indicates Ni = a} is calculated using Equation (3.5). The re-
sults are presented in Table 3.5 on the following page. Now, using Equation (3.6)
the P {Ni = b|asset indicates Ni = c} are calculated for each of the branches of Fig-
ure 3.7 on page 55. The results are presented in Table 3.6.
For each branch (i.e., P {asset indicates Ni = 0}, P {asset indicates Ni = 1},
and P {asset indicates Ni = 2}), the relative entropies are calculated. Then, the ex-
pected relative entropy, E [hi
′], is computed (see Table 3.7). Figure 3.9 depicts the
E [h1
′] calculation for n1. E [h2
′] and E [h3
′] are similarly calculated for n2 and n3.
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Table 3.5: Three-node Example: P {Asset indicates Ni = a}








Table 3.6: Three-node Example: P {Ni = b|asset indicates Ni = c}
Node (ni = i) Asset Indicates Ni = c Ni = b P {Ni = b|asset indicates Ni = c}

















Table 3.7: Three-node Example: Expected Entropies
Node (ni) Asset Indicates Ni = c hi
asset indicates Ni=c E [hi
′]
1 0 0.9940 0.9081
1 0.8631
2 0 0.9969 0.4923
1 0.1392




{ }1asset indicates N 0 0.3438P = =
{ }1asset indicates N 1 0.6563P = =
{ }1 10 | asset indicates N 0 0.5455P N = = =
{ }1 10 | asset indicates N 1 0.2857P N = = =
{ }1 11| asset indicates N 0 0.4545P N = = =
{ }1 11| asset indicates N 1 0.7143P N = = =
{ }1asset indicates 0
1 0.9940
Nh = =
{ }1asset indicates 1
1 0.8631
Nh = =
1 0.9081E h⎡ ⎤′ =⎣ ⎦1N
Figure 3.9: Three-node Example: Expected Entropy, E [hi
′], Calculation for n1
Finally, using Equation (3.8), the weighted expected changes in entropy, based
on the asset effectiveness estimates, the prior probability distributions, and nodal
priorities, are
δ1 = ρ1 (h1 − E [h1′])
= 2 (0.9544− 0.9081)
= 0.0926
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δ2 = ρ2 (h2 − E [h2′])
= 0.7798− 0.4923
= 0.2875
δ3 = ρ3 (h3 − E [h3′])
= 2 (0.6040− 0.5185)
= 0.1710.
δ2 is the maximum weighted change in expected entropy based on an intelligence
collection effort. Thus, the intelligence asset should be directed to collect on n2. This
is an interesting result because n2 was the only Priority 2 node. In addition, h1 is
the highest entropy value, which implies there is the greatest opportunity to reduce
the entropy. However, looking at Table 3.2 on page 62, the result checks out as the
intelligence asset was most effective versus n2 and least effective versus n1. Therefore,
even though n2 is a Priority 2 node, the intelligence asset would be better used being
directed to collect intelligence on n2 as opposed to n1 or n3. If a second intelligence
effort became available, then intelligence should be collected on n3, as it has the next
highest δ.
3.3.4 Sensitivity to Prior Probabilities and Asset Effectiveness Estimates.
The change in expected entropy, δi, is clearly dependent upon the prior probability
distributions, asset effectiveness estimates, and nodal priorities. Figures 3.10 and 3.11
depict the dependence of δi on the prior probability distributions and asset effective-
ness estimates, respectively. Both figures were constructed using a binary node like
n1 and n2 from the previous example.
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Figure 3.10: Dependence of δi on Prior Probabilities
Figure 3.10 plots δi versus P {Ni = 0} using
pi =
 P {Ni = 0}
1− P {Ni = 0}
 .
For Figure 3.10, the intelligence asset was estimated to be not effective at assessing
if Ni = 0 (i.e., P {asset indicates Ni = 0|Ni = 0} = 0.50) and marginally effective at
assessing if Ni = 1 (i.e., P {asset indicates Ni = 0|Ni = 0} = 0.75). Notice that the
maximum δi is obtained when
P {Ni = 0} = 1− P {Ni = 0}
= 0.5
and the minimum when





















Figure 3.11: Dependence of δi on Asset Effectiveness Estimates
or
P {Ni = 0} = 1.
The maximum change in expected entropy corresponds to the case where no prior
information (i.e., perfect uncertainty) on the current nodal state is possessed. Any
new information provided by an intelligence collection effort is expected to reduce
the entropy, hi. Likewise, if the node is known to exist in either state 0 or 1 with
probability 1, then assuming the state of the node did not change, any new intelligence
collection efforts are expected to have no impact on the entropy. The implication for
this sensitivity is that given a node that has little uncertainty associated with its
nodal state (i.e., hi ≈ 0), then performing additional intelligence collection efforts
on the node will have minimal impact on the level of uncertainty associated with its
nodal state.
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Figure 3.11 on the page before plots δi versus the intelligence asset effectiveness





The maximum δi is obtained when
P {asset indicates Ni = 0|Ni = 0} = 1
P {asset indicates Ni = 0|Ni 6= 0} = 0
or
P {asset indicates Ni = 0|Ni = 0} = 0
P {asset indicates Ni = 0|Ni 6= 0} = 1.
This implies the intelligence asset is able to perfectly discern between Ni = 0 and
Ni 6= 0. Note, the second set of probabilities seem to indicate the intelligence asset
is providing misinformation (i.e., indicating Ni = 0 when Ni 6= 0); however, the
intelligence asset estimates are a priori information. Thus, the intelligence analyst
knows the intelligence asset indication and the true state of the node are perfectly
negatively correlated. Therefore, when the asset indicates Ni = 0, the intelligence
analyst knows that the true state is Ni 6= 0.
The minimum δi’s are obtained when
P {asset indicates Ni = 0|Ni = 0} = P {asset indicates Ni = 0|Ni 6= 0} .
In other words, the P {asset indicates Ni = 0} is independent of the true state of ni.
When the intelligence effectiveness estimates are equal (or nearly equal) then no (or
little) information is provided on Ni. For example, consider a binary node like the
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ones used in Section 3.3.3, where
P {asset indicates Ni = 0|Ni = 0} = 0.75
P {asset indicates Ni = 1|Ni = 1} = 0.25.
Thus,
P {asset indicates Ni = 0|Ni 6= 0} = 0.75
which results in δi = 0.
3.4 Allocating Multiple Intelligence Assets Based on Nodal Uncertainty
In military operations, there will generally always be less intelligence collection
opportunities than the number of nodes within the SoSA network. Thus, the problem
becomes allocating assets to collect intelligence on the highest payoff nodes. The
goal then is to maximize the amount of information gain from a limited number of
intelligence collection opportunities. Now that a measure of the expected change in
entropy given an intelligence collection effort on a node is developed, a methodology
for allocating multiple intelligence assets can be developed.
3.4.1 General Methodology for Allocating Multiple Intelligence Assets .
First, the notation from the methodology presented in Section 3.3.1 must be ad-
justed to account for the multiple available intelligence assets. To accomplish this, a
second subscript, j, is added to E [hi
′] and δi. Now,
E [hij
′] = the expected entropy of ni given an intelligence collection effort by asset j
δij = the weighted expected change in entropy of ni given an intelligence
collection effort by asset j
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In addition, estimates for the effectiveness of asset j against Ni need to be obtained
for all the available intelligence assets and nodes in the SoSA network.
P {asset j indicates Ni = a|Ni = a}
Once, these estimates are established, the methodology from Section 3.3.1 can be
applied to obtain the δij’s for each intelligence asset and node combination.
From this, an integer program (IP), the generalized assignment problem (GAP),
can be accomplished [12]. Given m nodes and n intelligence assets, with
δij = weighted expected change in entropy of ni given an intelligence
collection effort by asset j
wij = amount of asset j capacity required to accomplish intelligence
collection on ni











wijxij ≤ cj, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (3.10)
n∑
j=1
xij ≤ 1, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (3.11)
xij ∈ {0, 1} , i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} , j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (3.12)
where
xij =
 1 if asset j collects intelligence on node i0 otherwise .
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Equation (3.10) is the capacity constraint for the intelligence asset. Equation (3.11)
ensures that at most one asset looks at a node, and Equation (3.12) makes the xij’s
indicator variables for whether or not asset j is collecting information on node i.
3.5 Chapter 3 Summary
Chapter 3 presented a mathematical model for SoSA networks, a methodology
for prioritizing a single intelligence asset’s intelligence collection efforts, and a method-
ology for allocating multiple intelligence assets. The SoSA mathematical model de-
fined notation and terminology forming the foundation for the later methodologies
for prioritizing and allocating intelligence collection efforts. The methodology for pri-
oritizing a single intelligence asset’s collection efforts was demonstrated for a simple
three-node example. The methodology for allocating multiple intelligence asset’s col-
lection efforts makes use of a generalized assignment problem. This methodology is
demonstrated in Chapter 4 on a 20-node, 4-asset example.
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IV. 20-Node, 4-Asset Example
4.1 Overview
In Chapter 3, a methodology for allocating multiple intelligence resources to
multiple nodes based on nodal uncertainty was developed. Calculation of the current












′′ = the probability Ni = l adjusted for the freshness of the
intelligence update and planned actions on ni.
A priority-weighted expected reduction in uncertainty was obtained by estimating the











is the expected entropy of node
i given an intelligence update by asset j. A generalized assignment problem (GAP)
was then formulated to allocate multiple intelligence assets to multiple nodes result-
ing in the maximum expected reduction in uncertainty (i.e., the maximum expected
information gain).
This chapter presents an application of the multiple intelligence asset method-
ology to a notional 20-node, 4-asset example. This example demonstrates the maxi-
mization of information gain through proper allocation of four intelligence assets.
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4.2 20-Node, 4-Asset Scenario
20 nodes are present within the scenario. Each node is one of five generic nodal
category types: person, radar, communications, economic, or vehicle. Using Matlabr
, the 20 nodes were assigned:
- a random number of discrete states (2, 4, or 6),
- nodal priority (1, 2, 3, or 4),
- freshness of the intelligence data (1-6) (i.e., days since the last intelligence up-
date),
- intelligence assessment (Almost Certainly Not in 1, etc.), and
- whether or not an action is planned against the node (0 or 1).
For the nodes for which actions are planned, notional posterior probabilities given an
action were provided. See Figure 4.1 on the following page for the given nodal data. It
was assumed that Priority 1 nodes are twice as important as Priority 2 nodes, which
are twice as important as Priority 3 nodes and four times as important as Priority 4
nodes (i.e., ρPriority 4 = 1, ρPriority 3 = 2, ρPriority 2 = 4, and ρPriority 1 = 8).
Available are four intelligence assets: an imagery intelligence (IMINT) source, a
electronic intelligence (ELINT) source, a human intelligence (HUMINT) source, and
a communications intelligence (COMINT) source. Within a 24-hour period, a limited
number of collection opportunities is available from each of these assets. Table 4.1 on
page 78 presents the collection capacities of each asset. In addition, only one asset can
be allocated per node. Note, this is a simplifying assumption to maintain indepen-
dence between the intelligence assets (and their effectiveness estimates). If multiple
assets were allowed to collect information on a single node, the resulting information
gain would be dependent upon the interaction between the assets.
Each nodal type requires a specific number of intelligence collection looks (wij)
to gather the required information for an intelligence assessment of the current nodal






































3 Economic 2 4 1 4 Probably Not in 1 0 0.7 1 0.75 0.9
1 0.3 0.1












7 Comm 2 2 4 2 Probably Not in 0 0 0.3 0 0 0
1 0.7 0
8 Person 2 3 2 2 Chances Even in 0 0 0.5 0 0 0
1 0.5 0
















12 Economic 2 4 1 2 Probably Not in 0 0 0.3 0 0
1 0.7 0
13 Vehicle 2 3 2 2 Probably in 1 0 0.25 1 0.9 0.9
1 0.75 0.1






15 Person 2 3 2 2 Almost Certainly in 0 0 0.93 0 0
1 0.07 0




















20 Vehicle 2 3 2 2 Chances Even in 1 0 0.5 1 0.25 0.95
1 0.5 0.05
Figure 4.1: 20-Node, 4-Asset Example: Given Data
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Table 4.1: 20-Node, 4-Asset Example: Intelligence Source Capacities
Maximum Number of Collection





Table 4.2: 20-Node, 4-Asset Example: Nodal Intelligence Requirements (wij)
Intelligence Requirements (wij)
Nodal Type IMINT ELINT HUMINT COMINT
Person 4 5 1 2
Radar 2 1 1 2
Communications 2 3 1 1
Economic 4 5 1 2
Vehicle 1 2 1 4
allocated to collect the information on the node. For example, a radar node may
require only one look from an ELINT source but may require multiple looks from an
IMINT source to capture the required information to perform an intelligence assess-
ment. Table 4.2 presents the intelligence requirements for each nodal type. Note, the
units of these intelligence looks are number of looks in a 24-hour period.
In order to calculate the expected change in entropy, δij, for each node/asset
combination, intelligence asset effectiveness estimates were also provided (see Fig-
ure 4.2 on the next page). These estimates were mapped to probabilities using Ta-
ble 4.3.
Table 4.3: Intelligence Asset Effectiveness Estimates






Nodal Type Number of States States IMINT ELINT HUMINT COMINT
Person 2 0 Not Effective Not Effective Very Effective Effective
1 Marginally Effective Not Effective Very Effective Very Effective
4 0 Not Effective Not Effective Very Effective Effective
1 Not Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
2 Not Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
3 Marginally Effective Not Effective Very Effective Very Effective
6 0 Not Effective Not Effective Very Effective Effective
1 Not Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
2 Not Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
3 Not Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
4 Not Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
5 Marginally Effective Not Effective Very Effective Very Effective
Radar 2 0 Effective Effective Effective Marginally Effective
1 Very Effective Very Effective Effective Effective
4 0 Effective Effective Effective Marginally Effective
1 Effective Effective Marginally Effective Marginally Effective
2 Effective Very Effective Marginally Effective Effective
3 Very Effective Very Effective Effective Effective
6 0 Effective Effective Effective Marginally Effective
1 Effective Effective Effective Marginally Effective
2 Effective Effective Marginally Effective Marginally Effective
3 Effective Very Effective Marginally Effective Effective
4 Effective Very Effective Marginally Effective Effective
5 Very Effective Very Effective Effective Effective
Communications 2 0 Effective Marginally Effective Effective Very Effective
1 Marginally Effective Effective Effective Very Effective
4 0 Effective Marginally Effective Effective Very Effective
1 Marginally Effective Marginally Effective Marginally Effective Very Effective
2 Marginally Effective Marginally Effective Marginally Effective Very Effective
3 Marginally Effective Effective Effective Very Effective
6 0 Effective Marginally Effective Effective Very Effective
1 Effective Marginally Effective Marginally Effective Very Effective
2 Marginally Effective Marginally Effective Marginally Effective Very Effective
3 Marginally Effective Marginally Effective Marginally Effective Very Effective
4 Marginally Effective Effective Marginally Effective Very Effective
5 Marginally Effective Effective Effective Very Effective
Economic 2 0 Effective Not Effective Very Effective Effective
1 Marginally Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
4 0 Effective Not Effective Very Effective Effective
1 Marginally Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
2 Marginally Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
3 Marginally Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
6 0 Effective Not Effective Very Effective Effective
1 Marginally Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
2 Marginally Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
3 Marginally Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
4 Marginally Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
5 Marginally Effective Not Effective Effective Effective
Vehicle 2 0 Very Effective Not Effective Effective Marginally Effective
1 Very Effective Marginally Effective Effective Marginally Effective
4 0 Very Effective Not Effective Effective Marginally Effective
1 Effective Not Effective Marginally Effective Not Effective
2 Effective Not Effective Marginally Effective Not Effective
3 Very Effective Marginally Effective Effective Marginally Effective
6 0 Very Effective Not Effective Effective Marginally Effective
1 Very Effective Not Effective Marginally Effective Not Effective
2 Effective Not Effective Marginally Effective Not Effective
3 Effective Not Effective Marginally Effective Not Effective
4 Very Effective Marginally Effective Marginally Effective Not Effective
5 Very Effective Marginally Effective Effective Marginally Effective
Asset Effectiveness
Figure 4.2: 20-Node, 4-Asset Example: Intelligence Asset Effectiveness Estimates
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Table 4.4: 20-Node, 4-Asset Example: Expected Changes in Entropy (δij)
Expected Change in Entropy (δij)
Intelligence Asset
Node IMINT ELINT HUMINT COMINT
1 5.312 0.197 3.545 1.017
2 2.767 2.946 2.033 1.930
3 0.230 0.000 0.488 0.342
4 3.359 2.860 3.548 6.197
5 6.353 0.526 4.263 1.218
6 1.736 0.000 2.694 2.364
7 1.301 1.347 2.050 3.327
8 0.098 0.000 1.717 1.380
9 2.288 0.063 1.526 0.449
10 1.959 1.542 1.752 2.965
11 3.534 0.000 5.388 5.196
12 0.325 0.000 0.655 0.512
13 1.016 0.049 0.590 0.200
14 0.498 0.000 0.753 0.722
15 0.078 0.000 1.464 1.118
16 0.718 0.581 0.765 1.290
17 0.718 0.088 0.456 0.088
18 1.600 0.149 1.082 0.328
19 2.198 2.152 2.198 3.690
20 1.649 0.092 1.015 0.359
4.3 20-Node, 4-Asset Model
The methodology for calculating the δij’s presented in Chapter 3 was applied to
each node/asset combination. See Appendix A for the calculations. The calculated
δij’s are summarized in Table 4.4. Next, using the provided wij’s and calculated δij’s,











wi IMxi IM ≤ 4
20∑
i=1
wi ELxi EL ≤ 6
20∑
i=1
wi HUMxi HUM ≤ 1
20∑
i=1
wi COMxi COM ≤ 6
4∑
j=1
xij ≤ 1, i ∈ {1, . . . , 20}
xij ∈ {0, 1} , i ∈ {1, . . . , 20} , j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}
where
xij =
 1 if asset j collects intelligence on node i0 otherwise .
4.4 20-Node, 4-Asset Example: Results and Analysis
The results to the GAP are summarized in Table 4.5 on the following page,
Table 4.6 on page 83, and Table 4.7 on page 83. Microsoft Excel’s Solver was used to
solve the GAP. The maximum expected reduction in entropy obtained was 43.05976.
All Priority 1 and Priority 2 nodes were assigned an intelligence asset. Three of
the four intelligence assets were fully tasked, while the ELINT source was under
tasked (i.e., the ELINT capacity constraint was not binding) (refer to Table 4.6 on
page 83). A quick look at the scenario lends insight into why the ELINT source was
undertasked. First, the intelligence requirements, wij, for the ELINT source were
higher for all node types except radar. There is only one radar in the scenario. In
addition, the ELINT source was estimated to be Not Effective or Marginally Effective
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Table 4.5: 20-Node, 4-Asset Example: GAP Results
Indicator Variable (xij)
Intelligence Asset (j)




1 1 0 0 0 5.312294
2 0 1 0 0 2.945542
3 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 6.197174
5 1 0 0 0 6.352986
6 0 0 0 1 2.363909
7 0 0 0 1 3.327207
8 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 0 0 0 2.287929
10 0 0 0 1 2.964695
11 0 0 1 0 5.388013
12 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 1 0 0 0.580939
17 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 1 3.689797
20 1 0 0 0 1.649275
z = 43.05976
against all node types except radar. Thus, collecting intelligence on these node types
is more effectively performed by the other intelligence assets.
4.5 Extensions to the General Methodology
The GAP presented in Section 3.4.1 and illustrated in the 20-node, 4-asset ex-
ample is intended to be a general methodology for allocating intelligence assets. A
couple extensions to the methodology could greatly increase the utility of the method-
ology. First, Constraint (3.11) restricts the number of intelligence assets allocated to
a single node to one. This restriction does not allow for the increased effectiveness of
tasking multiple assets to collect information on a node. For example, consider the
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Table 4.6: 20-Node, 4-Asset Example: Resource Usage
Resource Usage (wijxij)
Intelligence Asset(j)
Node(i) IMINT ELINT HUMINT COMINT
1 1 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1
5 1 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 2
7 0 0 0 1
8 0 0 0 0
9 1 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 1
11 0 0 1 0
12 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0
16 0 3 0 0
17 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 1
20 1 0 0 0
Total 4 4 1 6
Capacity (cij) 4 6 1 6
Table 4.7: 20-Node, 4-Asset Example: Intelligence Asset Allocations
Intelligence Source Node Type Priority




ELINT 2 Radar 2
16 Communications 3
HUMINT 11 Economic 1






event where information on a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system is to be collected.
Using an IMINT source or an ELINT source by itself would not be as effective as
combining the information provided by both intelligence assets to assess the current
state of the SAM. Next, many intelligence assets are capable of collecting informa-
tion on multiple nodes during a single intelligence collection effort. For example, a
HUMINT source may be able to simultaneously collect intelligence on more than one
node.
To address the need for packaging intelligence assets together to collect infor-




J = the set of all possible collections of intelligence assets
xig = a binary indicator variable for whether g is tasked to collect
intelligence on Ni
δig = weighted expected change in entropy of ni given an intelligence
collection effort by the collection of intelligence assets g
wig
j = amount of asset j capacity required to accomplish intelligence
collection on ni given an intelligence collection effort by the
collection of intelligence assets g
cj = capacity of asset j.
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jxig ≤ cj, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
∑
g∈J
xig ≤ 1, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
xig ∈ {0, 1} , i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} , g ∈ J
where
xig =
 1 if g collects intelligence on node i0 otherwise .
Note, if J is confined to single-asset collections, then the problem is the same as
the one presented in Section 3.4.1. However, if an operational restriction exists that
no more than k assets can (or will) be tasked against a single asset, then the GAP











This accounts for all possible ways of packaging k, k − 1, . . . , and 1 intelligence
assets. Obviously, the number of variables could be greatly trimmed down by various
elimination schemes. One example is to eliminate any collection of assets g that
contains more than one of any single type of intelligence asset (e.g., g can not contain
more than one IMINT source).
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Similarly, to address the capability of a single asset to collect on multiple nodes,
the indicator variables could be redefined to include sets of nodes. Then,
xhj = a binary indicator variable for whether asset j collects
intelligence on the set of nodes h
where,
h ∈ I
I = the set of possible collections of node(s).
To illustrate, given the 20-node, 4-asset example from Section 4.2, add the
requirement that no more than two intelligence assets can be tasked against a single
node. Furthermore, through geographical analysis, it is given that the ELINT source
can collect information on n4, n7, and n8 simultaneously. Let
I = {1, . . . , 20, (4, 7, 8)}
J = {(IM) , (EL) , (HUM) , (COM) , (IM, EL) , (IM, HUM) ,
(IM,COM) , (EL,HUM) , (EL,COM) , (HUM, COM)}
xhg =

































COMxhg ≤ 6 (4.5)
∑
g∈J
xhg ≤ 1, h ∈ I (4.6)
xhg ∈ {0, 1} , h ∈ I, g ∈ J . (4.7)
Equations (4.2) - (4.5) are the intelligence assets’ capacity constraints, which are
summed across all possible collections of nodes and all possible collections of assets.
Equation (4.6) limits the number of collections of assets that may be allocated to a
single node (or collection of nodes) to one. Finally, Equation (4.1) is the objective
function for all possible collections of nodes and assets.
4.6 20-Node, 4-Asset Example: Summary
This example successfully demonstrated the application of the multiple intelli-
gence asset allocation methodology. Although proven on a rather small example, the
methodology may easily be applied to much larger scenarios.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Overview
This chapter presents the conclusions from this research effort and the recom-
mendations for future research.
5.2 Conclusions
The primary goal of this research was to develop a methodology to prioritize
the limited supply of intelligence collection efforts. Intelligence collection has become
the limiting factor in performing military operations as there will always be less intel-
ligence collection opportunities than intelligence targets. These intelligence collection
efforts must be efficiently used in order to properly characterize an adversary’s current
state. This research’s methodologies proved to be effective in prioritizing intelligence
assets to maximize information gain while bound to intelligence asset constraints.
Due to the estimations for mapping of linguistic quantifiers to probabilities
and asset effectiveness versus nodes, the methodology is not intended to be the final
solution to prioritizing intelligence collection efforts. However, it will provide a good
first-cut at prioritizing the assets, which can then be adjusted by planners. Much
like the SoSA network within the EBO process, the major benefit of the method is
to provide insight to planners. SoSA networks are constructed of numerous nodes
and linkages; thus, when planning operations, it is difficult for an individual planner
(or even a team of planners) to keep track of all the information contained in the
network as well as available intelligence assets. Matching the two up is a daunting
task without the assistance of a methodology like the one presented in this research.
In the development of this research’s methodology, a mathematical model of
the SoSA network and a method for translating intelligence linguistic quantifiers to
probability distributions were developed. The SoSA mathematical model laid the
framework for the subsequent methodology and may be used for other EBO appli-
cations. Using Kent’s mapping of linguistic quantifiers to interval probabilities and
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the principle of maximum entropy, probability distributions were obtained for the
linguistic quantifiers.
These probability distributions were then updated using a methodology to in-
corporate the priorities of the nodes, the dynamic nature of the nodes, and any actions
planned against the nodes. A simple weighting scheme was used to account for nodal
priorities. Although simple, the weighting scheme was effective in stratifying the dif-
ferent priority nodes and ensuring that intelligence assets were allocated to the most
uncertain, highest priority nodes. The dynamic nature of the nodes was incorporated
into the model using a time-dependent erosion of the probability distribution towards
total uncertainty. Thus, as time passed since the last intelligence update, additional
uncertainty was introduced into the probability distributions. Finally, estimates for an
action’s probability of success and posterior probability distributions given an action
were used to update the probability distribution.
Once the prior probability distributions were updated, Shannon’s relative en-
tropy was used to quantify the uncertainty associated with the probability distribu-
tions. Then, using estimates for the intelligence asset effectiveness versus the nodes,
the expected entropy of the posterior probability distributions given an intelligence
collection effort was calculated. Next, the weighted expected reductions in entropy
given a intelligence collection effort were calculated.
These expected reductions in entropy were then used in an integer program (IP)
(specifically, the generalized assignment problem (GAP)) to allocate the intelligence
assets in an efficient manner. To formulate the GAP, the profits per asset/node
combination were the expected reductions in entropy calculated above. The costs of
the asset/node combinations were defined to be the number of intelligence collection
efforts required to perform an assessment of the node. The total costs for an asset
type were constrained to the maximum capacity of the asset (i.e., maximum number
of collection opportunities in a 24-hour period). The final constraint for the GAP
was that at most one asset could collect information on a node. For a notional 20-
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node, 4-asset example, the GAP was formulated and successfully solved providing an
allocation of the intelligence assets.
Extensions to the GAP were presented in Chapter 4. The GAP presented in
Chapter 3 is limited in that it does not permit multiple assets (i.e., collections of
assets) to be tasked against a single asset. The synergistic effects of tasking multiple
assets to collect information are not accounted for. In addition, the methodology does
not allow for an asset to collect information on more than one node simultaneously,
which may be accomplished operationally (i.e., based on geography or proximity).
To address these limitations, the GAP was reformulated to include the capability to
allocate sets of assets against sets of nodes.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
For this research, the nodes were assumed to independent. If an intelligence
collection effort were directed at a node, the resulting reduction in uncertainty had
no impact on neighboring nodes. Therefore, additional research should investigate the
dependence between nodes. One of the SoSA goals is to “determine direct and indirect
relationships between nodes within and across systems.” [10] An investigation into the
propagation of uncertainty across nodes may prove very useful and insightful in the
prioritization methodology. For example, gathering information on a neighboring
node may provide information on a target node at a lower cost than looking directly
at the node.
Next, the midpoints of Kent’s interval probabilities were used as point estimates
to quantify the linguistic quantifiers. Although a good estimate of the linguistic
quantifiers, using point estimates does not capture all the uncertainty associated with
these linguistic quantifiers. Further research should investigate using Kent’s interval
probabilities to quantify the linguistic quantifiers. In turn, the continuous case of
Shannon’s entropy would need to be added to the methodology. Another technique
that may be useful is using the upper and lower probabilities of Kent’s intervals as
bounds for the uncertainty present in the intelligence assessment.
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Chapter 4 demonstrated a 20-node, 4-asset example which used notional asset
effectiveness estimates. These estimates were then mapped to probabilities using a
notional mapping scheme (i.e., Effective = 0.90). The sensitivity of this mapping
needs further investigation. In addition, obtaining these estimates in a real-world
application may prove to be difficult. Methods for obtaining these estimates, which
are critical to the presented methodology, should be developed.
Also in Chapter 4, extensions to the GAP were discussed. These extensions in-
cluded reformulating the problem to account for the packaging of multiple intelligence
assets to collect information on a single node and/or the ability of a single intelligence
asset to collect information on more than one node simultaneously. Research is needed
to prove out the presented extensions to the methodologies. Additionally, the intel-
ligence asset effectiveness estimates would need further exploration as packaging the
assets would require additional estimates.
The nodal priority weighting scheme presented in this research used a simple
mapping to assign weights to the various priority types. Further research should
investigate other weighting schemes. The priority weights are highly influential in
deciding the final intelligence asset allocation. Weighting schemes could be developed
that are dependent upon the type of conflict or operation.
Finally, a quantitative comparison between the presented methodology and the
current methodologies used in operations for prioritizing intelligence assets should be
accomplished. Based on the allocation of intelligence assets from each methodology,
the total reduction in entropy (i.e., information gain) across the entire network could
be used as a measure of effectiveness to compare the two.
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1 4 1 8 3 Almost Certainly Not in 1 0 0.310 1 0.75 0.600 Very Effective 0.980 0.50 0.270 0.518 0.833 0.521 0.973 0.017 0.009 0.001 - - 0.106 0.169 5.312
1 0.070 0.300 Effective 0.900 0.190 0.273 0.254 0.014 0.966 0.019 0.002 - - 0.128
2 0.310 0.100 Effective 0.900 0.270 0.143 0.141 0.024 0.064 0.908 0.003 - - 0.269
3 0.310 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.270 0.068 0.083 0.041 0.109 0.057 0.793 - - 0.520
2 4 2 4 2 Almost Certainly in 3 0 0.023 1 0.75 0.400 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.137 0.334 0.957 0.319 0.943 0.035 0.019 0.003 - - 0.192 0.265 2.767
1 0.023 0.400 Effective 0.900 0.137 0.334 0.319 0.035 0.943 0.019 0.003 - - 0.192
2 0.023 0.200 Effective 0.900 0.137 0.184 0.189 0.059 0.059 0.877 0.005 - - 0.344
3 0.930 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.590 0.148 0.173 0.064 0.064 0.035 0.836 - - 0.448
3 2 4 1 4 Probably Not in 1 0 0.700 1 0.75 0.900 Effective 0.900 1.00 0.550 0.813 0.696 0.778 0.940 0.060 - - - - 0.328 0.466 0.230
1 0.300 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.450 0.188 0.222 0.366 0.634 - - - - 0.948
4 4 1 8 2 Probably in 2 0 0.233 1 0.75 0.450 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.242 0.398 0.852 0.408 0.877 0.081 0.029 0.012 - - 0.344 0.433 3.359
1 0.233 0.450 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.242 0.398 0.329 0.040 0.908 0.036 0.015 - - 0.290
2 0.300 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.275 0.144 0.159 0.083 0.208 0.677 0.032 - - 0.654
3 0.233 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.242 0.060 0.104 0.128 0.320 0.116 0.437 - - 0.894
5 4 1 8 6 Almost Certainly Not in 3 0 0.310 0 0.00 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.50 0.260 0.260 0.998 0.274 0.931 0.032 0.032 0.005 - - 0.226 0.204 6.353
1 0.310 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.260 0.260 0.246 0.007 0.952 0.035 0.006 - - 0.166
2 0.310 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.260 0.260 0.246 0.007 0.035 0.952 0.006 - - 0.166
3 0.070 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.220 0.220 0.235 0.007 0.037 0.037 0.919 - - 0.258
6 4 2 4 2 Chances Even in 2 0 0.167 1 0.50 0.800 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.208 0.504 0.873 0.495 0.917 0.026 0.040 0.018 - - 0.270 0.439 1.736
1 0.167 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.208 0.154 0.161 0.104 0.719 0.123 0.054 - - 0.641
2 0.500 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.375 0.238 0.216 0.078 0.059 0.823 0.040 - - 0.473
3 0.167 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.208 0.104 0.128 0.132 0.101 0.155 0.612 - - 0.785
7 2 2 4 2 Probably Not in 0 0 0.300 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 1.00 0.400 0.400 0.971 0.510 0.706 0.294 - - - - 0.874 0.646 1.301
1 0.700 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.600 0.600 0.490 0.082 0.918 - - - - 0.408
8 2 3 2 2 Chances Even in 0 2 0.500 0 0.00 0.000 Not Effective 0.500 1.00 0.500 0.500 1.000 0.375 0.667 0.333 - - - - 0.918 0.951 0.098
3 0.500 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.500 0.500 0.625 0.400 0.600 - - - - 0.971
9 4 2 4 2 Probably in 1 0 0.083 1 0.75 0.750 Very Effective 0.980 0.50 0.167 0.604 0.716 0.604 0.980 0.015 0.004 0.000 - - 0.080 0.144 2.288
1 0.750 0.200 Effective 0.900 0.500 0.275 0.254 0.016 0.973 0.010 0.001 - - 0.106
2 0.083 0.050 Effective 0.900 0.167 0.079 0.085 0.048 0.108 0.841 0.003 - - 0.397
3 0.083 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.167 0.042 0.057 0.071 0.162 0.047 0.721 - - 0.621
10 6 2 4 2 Almost Certainly in 3 0 0.014 1 0.90 0.300 Effective 0.900 0.39 0.090 0.279 0.800 0.279 0.901 0.020 0.050 0.026 0.002 0.002 0.244 0.310 1.959
1 0.014 0.300 Effective 0.900 0.090 0.279 0.279 0.020 0.901 0.050 0.026 0.002 0.002 0.244
2 0.014 0.300 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.090 0.279 0.229 0.024 0.024 0.916 0.032 0.002 0.002 0.221
3 0.930 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.548 0.145 0.135 0.041 0.041 0.104 0.807 0.003 0.003 0.396
4 0.014 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.090 0.009 0.040 0.141 0.141 0.352 0.183 0.171 0.011 0.884
5 0.014 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.090 0.009 0.040 0.141 0.141 0.352 0.183 0.011 0.171 0.884
11 6 1 8 3 Almost Certainly in 4 0 0.014 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.39 0.116 0.116 0.900 0.148 0.702 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.142 0.039 0.576 0.458 3.534
1 0.014 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.116 0.116 0.128 0.018 0.681 0.045 0.045 0.165 0.045 0.588
2 0.014 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.116 0.116 0.128 0.018 0.045 0.681 0.045 0.165 0.045 0.588
3 0.014 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.116 0.116 0.128 0.018 0.045 0.045 0.681 0.165 0.045 0.588
4 0.930 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.421 0.421 0.341 0.007 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.925 0.017 0.213
5 0.014 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.116 0.116 0.128 0.018 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.165 0.681 0.588
12 2 4 1 2 Probably Not in 0 0 0.300 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 1.00 0.400 0.400 0.971 0.510 0.706 0.294 - - - - 0.874 0.646 0.325
1 0.700 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.600 0.600 0.490 0.082 0.918 - - - - 0.408
13 2 3 2 2 Probably in 1 0 0.250 1 0.90 0.900 Very Effective 0.980 1.00 0.375 0.848 0.616 0.834 0.996 0.004 - - - - 0.035 0.108 1.016
1 0.750 0.100 Very Effective 0.980 0.625 0.153 0.166 0.102 0.898 - - - - 0.475
14 6 4 1 5 Chances Even in 3 0 0.100 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.39 0.153 0.153 0.992 0.180 0.765 0.043 0.043 0.065 0.043 0.043 0.513 0.494 0.498
1 0.100 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.020 0.753 0.050 0.076 0.050 0.050 0.524
2 0.100 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.020 0.050 0.753 0.076 0.050 0.050 0.524
3 0.500 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.233 0.233 0.209 0.015 0.037 0.037 0.838 0.037 0.037 0.388
4 0.100 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.020 0.050 0.050 0.076 0.753 0.050 0.524
5 0.100 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.020 0.050 0.050 0.076 0.050 0.753 0.524
15 2 3 2 2 Almost Certainly in 0 0 0.930 0 0.00 0.000 Not Effective 0.500 1.00 0.715 0.715 0.862 0.429 0.834 0.166 - - - - 0.649 0.823 0.078
1 0.070 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.285 0.285 0.571 0.626 0.374 - - - - 0.954
16 4 3 2 2 Probably Not in 2 0 0.233 1 0.75 0.800 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.242 0.660 0.716 0.623 0.955 0.018 0.019 0.008 - - 0.167 0.357 0.718
1 0.233 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.242 0.135 0.141 0.157 0.722 0.085 0.036 - - 0.616
2 0.300 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.275 0.144 0.146 0.151 0.077 0.738 0.034 - - 0.594
3 0.233 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.242 0.060 0.091 0.243 0.125 0.132 0.500 - - 0.878
17 6 4 1 2 Probably in 3 0 0.050 0 0.00 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.39 0.108 0.108 0.871 0.119 0.894 0.004 0.018 0.077 0.004 0.004 0.241 0.154 0.718
1 0.050 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.108 0.108 0.119 0.004 0.894 0.018 0.077 0.004 0.004 0.241
2 0.050 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.004 0.004 0.899 0.085 0.004 0.004 0.219
3 0.750 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.458 0.458 0.416 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.991 0.001 0.001 0.036
4 0.050 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.108 0.108 0.119 0.004 0.004 0.018 0.077 0.894 0.004 0.241
5 0.050 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.108 0.108 0.119 0.004 0.004 0.018 0.077 0.004 0.894 0.241
18 4 3 2 4 Almost Certainly Not 1 0 0.310 0 0.00 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.50 0.265 0.265 0.996 0.277 0.937 0.025 0.032 0.006 - - 0.212 0.196 1.600
1 0.070 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.205 0.205 0.197 0.009 0.937 0.045 0.009 - - 0.205
2 0.310 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.265 0.265 0.249 0.007 0.027 0.958 0.007 - - 0.151
3 0.310 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.265 0.265 0.277 0.006 0.025 0.032 0.937 - - 0.212
19 6 2 4 2 Almost Certainly Not in 4 0 0.186 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.39 0.176 0.176 0.995 0.195 0.816 0.018 0.045 0.045 0.030 0.045 0.427 0.445 2.198
1 0.186 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.176 0.176 0.195 0.018 0.816 0.045 0.045 0.030 0.045 0.427
2 0.186 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.176 0.176 0.163 0.022 0.022 0.812 0.054 0.036 0.054 0.430
3 0.186 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.176 0.176 0.163 0.022 0.022 0.054 0.812 0.036 0.054 0.430
4 0.070 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.118 0.118 0.122 0.029 0.029 0.072 0.072 0.726 0.072 0.561
5 0.186 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.176 0.176 0.163 0.022 0.022 0.054 0.054 0.036 0.812 0.430
20 2 3 2 2 Chances Even in 1 0 0.500 1 0.25 0.950 Very Effective 0.980 1.00 0.500 0.613 0.963 0.608 0.987 0.013 - - - - 0.098 0.139 1.649
1 0.500 0.050 Very Effective 0.980 0.500 0.388 0.392 0.031 0.969 - - - - 0.201
P{N_i=y | Asset Indicates N_i =x}












































1 4 1 8 3 Almost Certainly Not in 1 0 0.310 1 0.75 0.600 Not Effective 0.250 0.50 0.270 0.518 0.833 0.239 0.542 0.285 0.149 0.024 - - 0.766 0.808 0.197
1 0.070 0.300 Not Effective 0.250 0.190 0.273 0.239 0.542 0.285 0.149 0.024 - - 0.766
2 0.310 0.100 Not Effective 0.250 0.270 0.143 0.239 0.542 0.285 0.149 0.024 - - 0.766
3 0.310 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.270 0.068 0.284 0.456 0.240 0.126 0.178 - - 0.915
2 4 2 4 2 Almost Certainly in 3 0 0.023 1 0.75 0.400 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.137 0.334 0.957 0.314 0.957 0.035 0.004 0.003 - - 0.144 0.220 2.946
1 0.023 0.400 Effective 0.900 0.137 0.334 0.314 0.035 0.957 0.004 0.003 - - 0.144
2 0.023 0.200 Very Effective 0.980 0.137 0.184 0.204 0.055 0.055 0.886 0.005 - - 0.325
3 0.930 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.590 0.148 0.168 0.066 0.066 0.007 0.860 - - 0.379
3 2 4 1 4 Probably Not in 1 0 0.700 1 0.75 0.900 Not Effective 0.500 1.00 0.550 0.813 0.696 0.500 0.813 0.188 - - - - 0.696 0.696 0.000
1 0.300 0.100 Not Effective 0.500 0.450 0.188 0.500 0.813 0.188 - - - - 0.696
4 4 1 8 2 Probably in 2 0 0.233 1 0.75 0.450 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.50 0.242 0.398 0.852 0.346 0.864 0.096 0.035 0.006 - - 0.359 0.495 2.860
1 0.233 0.450 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.242 0.398 0.346 0.096 0.864 0.035 0.006 - - 0.359
2 0.300 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.275 0.144 0.176 0.188 0.188 0.612 0.011 - - 0.707
3 0.233 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.242 0.060 0.133 0.250 0.250 0.090 0.410 - - 0.920
5 4 1 8 6 Almost Certainly Not in 3 0 0.310 0 0.00 0.000 Not Effective 0.250 0.50 0.260 0.260 0.998 0.213 0.305 0.305 0.305 0.086 - - 0.936 0.933 0.526
1 0.310 0.000 Not Effective 0.250 0.260 0.260 0.213 0.305 0.305 0.305 0.086 - - 0.936
2 0.310 0.000 Not Effective 0.250 0.260 0.260 0.213 0.305 0.305 0.305 0.086 - - 0.936
3 0.070 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.220 0.220 0.360 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.458 - - 0.927
6 4 2 4 2 Chances Even in 2 0 0.167 1 0.50 0.800 Not Effective 0.250 0.50 0.208 0.504 0.873 0.250 0.504 0.154 0.238 0.104 - - 0.873 0.873 0.000
1 0.167 0.100 Not Effective 0.250 0.208 0.154 0.250 0.504 0.154 0.238 0.104 - - 0.873
2 0.500 0.100 Not Effective 0.250 0.375 0.238 0.250 0.504 0.154 0.238 0.104 - - 0.873
3 0.167 0.000 Not Effective 0.250 0.208 0.104 0.250 0.504 0.154 0.238 0.104 - - 0.873
7 2 2 4 2 Probably Not in 0 0 0.300 0 0.00 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 1.00 0.400 0.400 0.971 0.360 0.833 0.167 - - - - 0.650 0.634 1.347
1 0.700 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.600 0.600 0.640 0.156 0.844 - - - - 0.625
8 2 3 2 2 Chances Even in 0 2 0.500 0 0.00 0.000 Not Effective 0.500 1.00 0.500 0.500 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 - - - - 1.000 1.000 0.000
3 0.500 0.000 Not Effective 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 - - - - 1.000
9 4 2 4 2 Probably in 1 0 0.083 1 0.75 0.750 Not Effective 0.250 0.50 0.167 0.604 0.716 0.243 0.621 0.283 0.081 0.014 - - 0.662 0.700 0.063
1 0.750 0.200 Not Effective 0.250 0.500 0.275 0.243 0.621 0.283 0.081 0.014 - - 0.662
2 0.083 0.050 Not Effective 0.250 0.167 0.079 0.243 0.621 0.283 0.081 0.014 - - 0.662
3 0.083 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.167 0.042 0.271 0.558 0.254 0.073 0.115 - - 0.804
10 6 2 4 2 Almost Certainly in 3 0 0.014 1 0.90 0.300 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.39 0.090 0.279 0.800 0.245 0.855 0.057 0.057 0.030 0.001 0.001 0.321 0.414 1.542
1 0.014 0.300 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.090 0.279 0.245 0.057 0.855 0.057 0.030 0.001 0.001 0.321
2 0.014 0.300 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.090 0.279 0.245 0.057 0.057 0.855 0.030 0.001 0.001 0.321
3 0.930 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.548 0.145 0.151 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.720 0.001 0.001 0.510
4 0.014 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.090 0.009 0.057 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.126 0.142 0.003 0.886
5 0.014 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.090 0.009 0.057 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.126 0.003 0.142 0.886
11 6 1 8 3 Almost Certainly in 4 0 0.014 0 0.00 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.39 0.116 0.116 0.900 0.167 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.421 0.116 0.900 0.900 0.000
1 0.014 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.116 0.116 0.167 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.421 0.116 0.900
2 0.014 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.116 0.116 0.167 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.421 0.116 0.900
3 0.014 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.116 0.116 0.167 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.421 0.116 0.900
4 0.930 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.421 0.421 0.167 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.421 0.116 0.900
5 0.014 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.116 0.116 0.167 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.421 0.116 0.900
12 2 4 1 2 Probably Not in 0 0 0.300 0 0.00 0.000 Not Effective 0.500 1.00 0.400 0.400 0.971 0.500 0.400 0.600 - - - - 0.971 0.971 0.000
1 0.700 0.000 Not Effective 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.400 0.600 - - - - 0.971
13 2 3 2 2 Probably in 1 0 0.250 1 0.90 0.900 Not Effective 0.500 1.00 0.375 0.848 0.616 0.462 0.917 0.083 - - - - 0.411 0.591 0.049
1 0.750 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.625 0.153 0.538 0.787 0.213 - - - - 0.746
14 6 4 1 5 Chances Even in 3 0 0.100 0 0.00 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.39 0.153 0.153 0.992 0.167 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.233 0.153 0.153 0.992 0.992 0.000
1 0.100 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.153 0.153 0.167 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.233 0.153 0.153 0.992
2 0.100 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.153 0.153 0.167 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.233 0.153 0.153 0.992
3 0.500 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.233 0.233 0.167 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.233 0.153 0.153 0.992
4 0.100 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.153 0.153 0.167 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.233 0.153 0.153 0.992
5 0.100 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.153 0.153 0.167 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.233 0.153 0.153 0.992
15 2 3 2 2 Almost Certainly in 0 0 0.930 0 0.00 0.000 Not Effective 0.500 1.00 0.715 0.715 0.862 0.500 0.715 0.285 - - - - 0.862 0.862 0.000
1 0.070 0.000 Not Effective 0.500 0.285 0.285 0.500 0.715 0.285 - - - - 0.862
16 4 3 2 2 Probably Not in 2 0 0.233 1 0.75 0.800 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.50 0.242 0.660 0.716 0.521 0.951 0.022 0.023 0.004 - - 0.172 0.426 0.581
1 0.233 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.242 0.135 0.171 0.323 0.595 0.070 0.012 - - 0.658
2 0.300 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.275 0.144 0.176 0.312 0.064 0.612 0.011 - - 0.643
3 0.233 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.242 0.060 0.133 0.415 0.085 0.090 0.410 - - 0.835
17 6 4 1 2 Probably in 3 0 0.050 0 0.00 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.39 0.108 0.108 0.871 0.141 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.540 0.038 0.038 0.765 0.784 0.088
1 0.050 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.108 0.108 0.141 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.540 0.038 0.038 0.765
2 0.050 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.108 0.108 0.141 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.540 0.038 0.038 0.765
3 0.750 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.458 0.458 0.141 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.540 0.038 0.038 0.765
4 0.050 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.108 0.108 0.217 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.352 0.374 0.025 0.808
5 0.050 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.108 0.108 0.217 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.352 0.025 0.374 0.808
18 4 3 2 4 Almost Certainly Not 1 0 0.310 0 0.00 0.000 Not Effective 0.250 0.50 0.265 0.265 0.996 0.206 0.322 0.249 0.322 0.107 - - 0.949 0.922 0.149
1 0.070 0.000 Not Effective 0.250 0.205 0.205 0.206 0.322 0.249 0.322 0.107 - - 0.949
2 0.310 0.000 Not Effective 0.250 0.265 0.265 0.206 0.322 0.249 0.322 0.107 - - 0.949
3 0.310 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.265 0.265 0.383 0.173 0.134 0.173 0.520 - - 0.878
19 6 2 4 2 Almost Certainly Not in 4 0 0.186 0 0.00 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.39 0.176 0.176 0.995 0.165 0.803 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.014 0.021 0.441 0.457 2.152
1 0.186 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.176 0.176 0.165 0.054 0.803 0.054 0.054 0.014 0.021 0.441
2 0.186 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.176 0.176 0.165 0.054 0.054 0.803 0.054 0.014 0.021 0.441
3 0.186 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.176 0.176 0.165 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.803 0.014 0.021 0.441
4 0.070 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.118 0.118 0.145 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.733 0.024 0.557
5 0.186 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.176 0.176 0.196 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.012 0.808 0.437
20 2 3 2 2 Chances Even in 1 0 0.500 1 0.25 0.950 Not Effective 0.500 1.00 0.500 0.613 0.963 0.403 0.760 0.240 - - - - 0.796 0.917 0.092
1 0.500 0.050 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.500 0.388 0.597 0.513 0.487 - - - - 1.000
P{N_i=y | Asset Indicates N_i =x}












































1 4 1 8 3 Almost Certainly Not in 1 0 0.310 1 0.75 0.600 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.270 0.518 0.833 0.503 0.927 0.045 0.024 0.004 - - 0.233 0.390 3.545
1 0.070 0.300 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.190 0.273 0.236 0.073 0.867 0.050 0.010 - - 0.368
2 0.310 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.270 0.143 0.149 0.116 0.152 0.717 0.015 - - 0.605
3 0.310 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.270 0.068 0.113 0.153 0.202 0.105 0.540 - - 0.852
2 4 2 4 2 Almost Certainly in 3 0 0.023 1 0.75 0.400 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.137 0.334 0.957 0.349 0.862 0.080 0.044 0.014 - - 0.380 0.449 2.033
1 0.023 0.400 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.137 0.334 0.282 0.039 0.889 0.054 0.017 - - 0.333
2 0.023 0.200 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.137 0.184 0.182 0.061 0.153 0.759 0.027 - - 0.552
3 0.930 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.590 0.148 0.187 0.060 0.149 0.082 0.710 - - 0.649
3 2 4 1 4 Probably Not in 1 0 0.700 1 0.75 0.900 Very Effective 0.980 1.00 0.550 0.813 0.696 0.815 0.977 0.023 - - - - 0.158 0.208 0.488
1 0.300 0.100 Effective 0.900 0.450 0.188 0.185 0.088 0.912 - - - - 0.429
4 4 1 8 2 Probably in 2 0 0.233 1 0.75 0.450 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.242 0.398 0.852 0.405 0.884 0.082 0.030 0.005 - - 0.321 0.409 3.548
1 0.233 0.450 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.242 0.398 0.326 0.041 0.916 0.037 0.006 - - 0.262
2 0.300 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.275 0.144 0.156 0.085 0.212 0.690 0.013 - - 0.613
3 0.233 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.242 0.060 0.113 0.118 0.294 0.106 0.482 - - 0.867
5 4 1 8 6 Almost Certainly Not in 3 0 0.310 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.260 0.260 0.998 0.285 0.822 0.076 0.076 0.026 - - 0.467 0.465 4.263
1 0.310 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.260 0.260 0.233 0.037 0.838 0.093 0.032 - - 0.433
2 0.310 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.260 0.260 0.233 0.037 0.093 0.838 0.032 - - 0.433
3 0.070 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.220 0.220 0.250 0.035 0.087 0.087 0.792 - - 0.523
6 4 2 4 2 Chances Even in 2 0 0.167 1 0.50 0.800 Very Effective 0.980 0.50 0.208 0.504 0.873 0.511 0.968 0.010 0.016 0.007 - - 0.127 0.200 2.694
1 0.167 0.100 Effective 0.900 0.208 0.154 0.154 0.022 0.904 0.052 0.023 - - 0.298
2 0.500 0.100 Effective 0.900 0.375 0.238 0.226 0.015 0.023 0.947 0.015 - - 0.191
3 0.167 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.208 0.104 0.110 0.031 0.047 0.072 0.851 - - 0.415
7 2 2 4 2 Probably Not in 0 0 0.300 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 1.00 0.400 0.400 0.971 0.420 0.857 0.143 - - - - 0.592 0.458 2.050
1 0.700 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.600 0.600 0.580 0.069 0.931 - - - - 0.362
8 2 3 2 2 Chances Even in 0 2 0.500 0 0.00 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 1.00 0.500 0.500 1.000 0.500 0.980 0.020 - - - - 0.141 0.141 1.717
3 0.500 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.020 0.980 - - - - 0.141
9 4 2 4 2 Probably in 1 0 0.083 1 0.75 0.750 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.167 0.604 0.716 0.575 0.946 0.040 0.011 0.002 - - 0.178 0.335 1.526
1 0.750 0.200 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.500 0.275 0.234 0.086 0.880 0.028 0.006 - - 0.328
2 0.083 0.050 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.167 0.079 0.104 0.194 0.221 0.572 0.013 - - 0.742
3 0.083 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.167 0.042 0.087 0.231 0.263 0.076 0.430 - - 0.900
10 6 2 4 2 Almost Certainly in 3 0 0.014 1 0.90 0.300 Effective 0.900 0.39 0.090 0.279 0.800 0.287 0.875 0.049 0.049 0.025 0.002 0.001 0.289 0.362 1.752
1 0.014 0.300 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.090 0.279 0.237 0.024 0.884 0.059 0.031 0.002 0.001 0.272
2 0.014 0.300 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.090 0.279 0.237 0.024 0.059 0.884 0.031 0.002 0.001 0.272
3 0.930 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.548 0.145 0.143 0.039 0.098 0.098 0.761 0.003 0.001 0.455
4 0.014 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.090 0.009 0.048 0.117 0.293 0.293 0.152 0.142 0.004 0.868
5 0.014 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.090 0.009 0.049 0.113 0.283 0.283 0.147 0.009 0.165 0.883
11 6 1 8 3 Almost Certainly in 4 0 0.014 0 0.00 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.39 0.116 0.116 0.900 0.131 0.865 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.064 0.018 0.327 0.226 5.388
1 0.014 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.116 0.116 0.120 0.004 0.868 0.019 0.019 0.070 0.019 0.312
2 0.014 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.116 0.116 0.120 0.004 0.019 0.868 0.019 0.070 0.019 0.312
3 0.014 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.116 0.116 0.120 0.004 0.019 0.019 0.868 0.070 0.019 0.312
4 0.930 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.421 0.421 0.389 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.975 0.006 0.086
5 0.014 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.116 0.116 0.120 0.004 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.070 0.868 0.312
12 2 4 1 2 Probably Not in 0 0 0.300 0 0.00 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 1.00 0.400 0.400 0.971 0.452 0.867 0.133 - - - - 0.565 0.316 0.655
1 0.700 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.600 0.600 0.548 0.015 0.985 - - - - 0.110
13 2 3 2 2 Probably in 1 0 0.250 1 0.90 0.900 Effective 0.900 1.00 0.375 0.848 0.616 0.778 0.980 0.020 - - - - 0.139 0.321 0.590
1 0.750 0.100 Effective 0.900 0.625 0.153 0.222 0.382 0.618 - - - - 0.959
14 6 4 1 5 Chances Even in 3 0 0.100 0 0.00 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.39 0.153 0.153 0.992 0.167 0.899 0.018 0.018 0.028 0.018 0.018 0.273 0.239 0.753
1 0.100 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.153 0.153 0.152 0.004 0.905 0.020 0.031 0.020 0.020 0.254
2 0.100 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.153 0.153 0.152 0.004 0.020 0.905 0.031 0.020 0.020 0.254
3 0.500 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.233 0.233 0.223 0.003 0.014 0.014 0.942 0.014 0.014 0.172
4 0.100 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.153 0.153 0.152 0.004 0.020 0.020 0.031 0.905 0.020 0.254
5 0.100 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.153 0.153 0.152 0.004 0.020 0.020 0.031 0.020 0.905 0.254
15 2 3 2 2 Almost Certainly in 0 0 0.930 0 0.00 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 1.00 0.715 0.715 0.862 0.706 0.992 0.008 - - - - 0.068 0.130 1.464
1 0.070 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.285 0.285 0.294 0.049 0.951 - - - - 0.281
16 4 3 2 2 Probably Not in 2 0 0.233 1 0.75 0.800 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.242 0.660 0.716 0.620 0.959 0.018 0.019 0.003 - - 0.150 0.334 0.765
1 0.233 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.242 0.135 0.138 0.160 0.738 0.087 0.015 - - 0.571
2 0.300 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.275 0.144 0.143 0.154 0.079 0.753 0.014 - - 0.549
3 0.233 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.242 0.060 0.100 0.221 0.113 0.120 0.546 - - 0.841
17 6 4 1 2 Probably in 3 0 0.050 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.39 0.108 0.108 0.871 0.139 0.702 0.039 0.039 0.165 0.039 0.016 0.553 0.416 0.456
1 0.050 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.108 0.108 0.119 0.018 0.681 0.045 0.192 0.045 0.018 0.561
2 0.050 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.108 0.108 0.119 0.018 0.045 0.681 0.192 0.045 0.018 0.561
3 0.750 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.458 0.458 0.364 0.006 0.015 0.015 0.944 0.015 0.006 0.169
4 0.050 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.108 0.108 0.119 0.018 0.045 0.045 0.192 0.681 0.018 0.561
5 0.050 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.108 0.108 0.139 0.016 0.039 0.039 0.165 0.039 0.702 0.553
18 4 3 2 4 Almost Certainly Not 1 0 0.310 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.265 0.265 0.996 0.287 0.832 0.060 0.077 0.031 - - 0.451 0.455 1.082
1 0.070 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.205 0.205 0.194 0.046 0.795 0.114 0.046 - - 0.514
2 0.310 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.265 0.265 0.234 0.038 0.073 0.851 0.038 - - 0.416
3 0.310 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.265 0.265 0.287 0.031 0.060 0.077 0.832 - - 0.451
19 6 2 4 2 Almost Certainly Not in 4 0 0.186 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.39 0.176 0.176 0.995 0.195 0.816 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.030 0.018 0.427 0.445 2.198
1 0.186 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.176 0.176 0.163 0.022 0.812 0.054 0.054 0.036 0.022 0.430
2 0.186 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.176 0.176 0.163 0.022 0.054 0.812 0.054 0.036 0.022 0.430
3 0.186 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.176 0.176 0.163 0.022 0.054 0.054 0.812 0.036 0.022 0.430
4 0.070 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.118 0.118 0.122 0.029 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.726 0.029 0.561
5 0.186 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.176 0.176 0.195 0.018 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.030 0.816 0.427
20 2 3 2 2 Chances Even in 1 0 0.500 1 0.25 0.950 Effective 0.900 1.00 0.500 0.613 0.963 0.590 0.934 0.066 - - - - 0.350 0.456 1.015
1 0.500 0.050 Effective 0.900 0.500 0.388 0.410 0.149 0.851 - - - - 0.608
P{N_i=y | Asset Indicates N_i =x}












































1 4 1 8 3 Almost Certainly Not in 1 0 0.310 1 0.75 0.600 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.50 0.270 0.518 0.833 0.498 0.780 0.137 0.072 0.011 - - 0.509 0.706 1.017
1 0.070 0.300 Not Effective 0.250 0.190 0.273 0.153 0.283 0.447 0.234 0.037 - - 0.850
2 0.310 0.100 Not Effective 0.250 0.270 0.143 0.153 0.283 0.447 0.234 0.037 - - 0.850
3 0.310 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.270 0.068 0.198 0.218 0.345 0.180 0.256 - - 0.979
2 4 2 4 2 Almost Certainly in 3 0 0.023 1 0.75 0.400 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.50 0.137 0.334 0.957 0.290 0.866 0.096 0.021 0.017 - - 0.361 0.474 1.930
1 0.023 0.400 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.137 0.334 0.290 0.096 0.866 0.021 0.017 - - 0.361
2 0.023 0.200 Effective 0.900 0.137 0.184 0.226 0.123 0.123 0.732 0.022 - - 0.597
3 0.930 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.590 0.148 0.195 0.143 0.143 0.032 0.682 - - 0.668
3 2 4 1 4 Probably Not in 1 0 0.700 1 0.75 0.900 Effective 0.900 1.00 0.550 0.813 0.696 0.750 0.975 0.025 - - - - 0.169 0.354 0.342
1 0.300 0.100 Effective 0.900 0.450 0.188 0.250 0.325 0.675 - - - - 0.910
4 4 1 8 2 Probably in 2 0 0.233 1 0.75 0.450 Very Effective 0.980 0.50 0.242 0.398 0.852 0.394 0.990 0.007 0.002 0.001 - - 0.047 0.078 6.197
1 0.233 0.450 Very Effective 0.980 0.242 0.398 0.394 0.007 0.990 0.002 0.001 - - 0.047
2 0.300 0.100 Very Effective 0.980 0.275 0.144 0.147 0.018 0.018 0.961 0.003 - - 0.144
3 0.233 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.242 0.060 0.065 0.041 0.041 0.015 0.904 - - 0.298
5 4 1 8 6 Almost Certainly Not in 3 0 0.310 0 0.00 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.50 0.260 0.260 0.998 0.343 0.568 0.189 0.189 0.053 - - 0.799 0.846 1.218
1 0.310 0.000 Not Effective 0.250 0.260 0.260 0.170 0.127 0.382 0.382 0.108 - - 0.893
2 0.310 0.000 Not Effective 0.250 0.260 0.260 0.170 0.127 0.382 0.382 0.108 - - 0.893
3 0.070 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.220 0.220 0.317 0.068 0.205 0.205 0.521 - - 0.846
6 4 2 4 2 Chances Even in 2 0 0.167 1 0.50 0.800 Effective 0.900 0.50 0.208 0.504 0.873 0.470 0.965 0.011 0.017 0.007 - - 0.136 0.282 2.364
1 0.167 0.100 Effective 0.900 0.208 0.154 0.167 0.101 0.831 0.047 0.021 - - 0.440
2 0.500 0.100 Effective 0.900 0.375 0.238 0.239 0.070 0.021 0.894 0.015 - - 0.311
3 0.167 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.208 0.104 0.124 0.136 0.042 0.064 0.758 - - 0.569
7 2 2 4 2 Probably Not in 0 0 0.300 0 0.00 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 1.00 0.400 0.400 0.971 0.404 0.970 0.030 - - - - 0.193 0.139 3.327
1 0.700 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.600 0.600 0.596 0.013 0.987 - - - - 0.103
8 2 3 2 2 Chances Even in 0 2 0.500 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 1.00 0.500 0.500 1.000 0.460 0.978 0.022 - - - - 0.151 0.310 1.380
3 0.500 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.500 0.500 0.540 0.093 0.907 - - - - 0.445
9 4 2 4 2 Probably in 1 0 0.083 1 0.75 0.750 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.50 0.167 0.604 0.716 0.545 0.831 0.126 0.036 0.006 - - 0.409 0.604 0.449
1 0.750 0.200 Not Effective 0.250 0.500 0.275 0.142 0.354 0.483 0.139 0.024 - - 0.782
2 0.083 0.050 Not Effective 0.250 0.167 0.079 0.142 0.354 0.483 0.139 0.024 - - 0.782
3 0.083 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.167 0.042 0.170 0.296 0.404 0.116 0.184 - - 0.929
10 6 2 4 2 Almost Certainly in 3 0 0.014 1 0.90 0.300 Very Effective 0.980 0.39 0.090 0.279 0.800 0.276 0.990 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.059 2.965
1 0.014 0.300 Very Effective 0.980 0.090 0.279 0.276 0.004 0.990 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.039
2 0.014 0.300 Very Effective 0.980 0.090 0.279 0.276 0.004 0.004 0.990 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.039
3 0.930 0.100 Very Effective 0.980 0.548 0.145 0.145 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.976 0.000 0.000 0.078
4 0.014 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.090 0.009 0.013 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.045 0.691 0.003 0.586
5 0.014 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.090 0.009 0.013 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.045 0.003 0.691 0.586
11 6 1 8 3 Almost Certainly in 4 0 0.014 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.39 0.116 0.116 0.900 0.122 0.855 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.069 0.019 0.346 0.250 5.196
1 0.014 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.116 0.116 0.122 0.019 0.855 0.019 0.019 0.069 0.019 0.346
2 0.014 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.116 0.116 0.122 0.019 0.019 0.855 0.019 0.069 0.019 0.346
3 0.014 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.116 0.116 0.122 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.855 0.069 0.019 0.346
4 0.930 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.421 0.421 0.391 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.970 0.006 0.101
5 0.014 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.116 0.116 0.122 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.069 0.855 0.346
12 2 4 1 2 Probably Not in 0 0 0.300 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 1.00 0.400 0.400 0.971 0.420 0.857 0.143 - - - - 0.592 0.458 0.512
1 0.700 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.600 0.600 0.580 0.069 0.931 - - - - 0.362
13 2 3 2 2 Probably in 1 0 0.250 1 0.90 0.900 Marginally Effective 0.750 1.00 0.375 0.848 0.616 0.674 0.943 0.057 - - - - 0.314 0.516 0.200
1 0.750 0.100 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.625 0.153 0.326 0.649 0.351 - - - - 0.935
14 6 4 1 5 Chances Even in 3 0 0.100 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.39 0.153 0.153 0.992 0.155 0.891 0.020 0.020 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.290 0.269 0.722
1 0.100 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.153 0.153 0.155 0.020 0.891 0.020 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.290
2 0.100 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.153 0.153 0.155 0.020 0.020 0.891 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.290
3 0.500 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.233 0.233 0.225 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.932 0.014 0.014 0.200
4 0.100 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.153 0.153 0.155 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.030 0.891 0.020 0.290
5 0.100 0.000 Effective 0.900 0.153 0.153 0.155 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.030 0.020 0.891 0.290
15 2 3 2 2 Almost Certainly in 0 0 0.930 0 0.00 0.000 Effective 0.900 1.00 0.715 0.715 0.862 0.649 0.991 0.009 - - - - 0.073 0.303 1.118
1 0.070 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.285 0.285 0.351 0.204 0.796 - - - - 0.730
16 4 3 2 2 Probably Not in 2 0 0.233 1 0.75 0.800 Very Effective 0.980 0.50 0.242 0.660 0.716 0.649 0.997 0.001 0.001 0.001 - - 0.019 0.071 1.290
1 0.233 0.100 Very Effective 0.980 0.242 0.135 0.138 0.032 0.958 0.007 0.003 - - 0.146
2 0.300 0.100 Very Effective 0.980 0.275 0.144 0.147 0.030 0.006 0.961 0.003 - - 0.138
3 0.233 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.242 0.060 0.065 0.067 0.014 0.015 0.904 - - 0.284
17 6 4 1 2 Probably in 3 0 0.050 0 0.00 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.39 0.108 0.108 0.871 0.217 0.374 0.083 0.083 0.352 0.083 0.025 0.808 0.784 0.088
1 0.050 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.108 0.108 0.141 0.038 0.128 0.128 0.540 0.128 0.038 0.765
2 0.050 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.108 0.108 0.141 0.038 0.128 0.128 0.540 0.128 0.038 0.765
3 0.750 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.458 0.458 0.141 0.038 0.128 0.128 0.540 0.128 0.038 0.765
4 0.050 0.000 Not Effective 0.167 0.108 0.108 0.141 0.038 0.128 0.128 0.540 0.128 0.038 0.765
5 0.050 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.108 0.108 0.217 0.025 0.083 0.083 0.352 0.083 0.374 0.808
18 4 3 2 4 Almost Certainly Not 1 0 0.310 0 0.00 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.50 0.265 0.265 0.996 0.338 0.587 0.151 0.196 0.065 - - 0.790 0.832 0.328
1 0.070 0.000 Not Effective 0.250 0.205 0.205 0.162 0.137 0.317 0.410 0.137 - - 0.919
2 0.310 0.000 Not Effective 0.250 0.265 0.265 0.162 0.137 0.317 0.410 0.137 - - 0.919
3 0.310 0.000 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.265 0.265 0.338 0.065 0.151 0.196 0.587 - - 0.790
19 6 2 4 2 Almost Certainly Not in 4 0 0.186 0 0.00 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.39 0.176 0.176 0.995 0.176 0.981 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.069 0.072 3.690
1 0.186 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.004 0.981 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.069
2 0.186 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.004 0.004 0.981 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.069
3 0.186 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.981 0.003 0.004 0.069
4 0.070 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.118 0.118 0.119 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.970 0.006 0.101
5 0.186 0.000 Very Effective 0.980 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.981 0.069
20 2 3 2 2 Chances Even in 1 0 0.500 1 0.25 0.950 Marginally Effective 0.750 1.00 0.500 0.613 0.963 0.556 0.826 0.174 - - - - 0.667 0.784 0.359
1 0.500 0.050 Marginally Effective 0.750 0.500 0.388 0.444 0.345 0.655 - - - - 0.930
P{N_i=y | Asset Indicates N_i =x}
Figure A.4: 20-Node, 4-Asset Example: δij Calculations–COMINT
95
Bibliography
1. American Heritage Publishing Company. The American Heritage Dictionary of
the English Language. Houghton Mifflin, 2000.
2. Bonissone, P. P. and R. M. Tong. “Editorial: Reasoning with uncertainty in
expert systems”. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 22(3):241–250,
Mar 1985.
3. Bonissone, P. P. and N. C. Wood. “T-norm based reasoning in situation assess-
ment applications”. Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 3, 241–256. Elsevier
Science Publishers, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1989.
4. Bosc, P. and H. Prade. “An Introduction to the Fuzzy Set and Possibility Theory-
Based Treatment of Flexible Queries and Uncertain or Imprecise Databases”.
Uncertainty Management in Information Systems, 285–324. 1996.
5. Carrington, J. Scott S. Wasserman, P. J. and M. Granovetter. Models and Meth-
ods in Social Network Analysis (Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences). Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005.
6. Druzdzel, M. J. and M. Henrion. “Efficient Reasoning in Qualitative Probabilistic
Networks”. Proceedings of the 11th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
548–553. AAAI Press/MIT Press, Menlo Park, CA, 1993.
7. Feder, M. and N. Merhav. “Relations between entropy and error probability”.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 40(1):259–266, 1994.
8. Haimes, Y. Y. Risk Modeling, Assessment, and Management (Wiley Series in
Systems Engineering and Management). John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2004.
9. Jaynes, E. T. “Information theory and statistical mechanics”. Physical Review,
106(4):620–630, May 1957.
10. Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7: Operational Im-
plications of Effects-based Operations. Joint Warfighting Center; United States
Joint Forces Command, November 2004.
11. Kent, S. Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays.
History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency,
1994.
12. Martello, Silvano and Paolo Toth. Knapsack Problems: Algorithms and Com-
puter Implementations (Wiley Interscience Series in Discrete Mathematics and
Optimization). John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1990.
13. Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster’s Concise Dictionary of English Usage.
Merriam-Webster, 2002.
96
14. Parsons, S. Qualitative Methods for Reasoning Under Uncertainty. MIT Press,
2001.
15. Rudner, Lawrence M. “An examination of decision-theory adaptive testing pro-
cedures”, April 2002. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Educational Research Association.
16. Shannon, C. E. “A mathematical theory of communication”. The Bell Systems
Technology Journal, 27:379–423, 1948.
17. Smets, P. “Imperfect Information: Imprecision and Uncertainty.” Uncertainty
Management in Information Systems, 225–254. 1996.
18. Smithson, M. Ignorance and Uncertainty: Emerging Paradigms (Cognitive Sci-
ence). Springer, 1989.
19. Suzuki, R. Saito, H. and M. Tomita. “The ’weighted sum of relative entropy’: a
new index for synonymous codon usage bias”. Gene, 335:19–23, June 23 2004.
20. Wellman, M. P. “Fundamental concepts of qualitative probabilistic networks”.
Artificial Intelligence, 44(3):257–303, Aug 1990.
21. Xiang, Y. Probabilistic Reasoning in Multiagent Systems: A Graphical Models
Approach. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
97
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704–0188
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704–0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway,
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection
of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD–MM–YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From — To)
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT
NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)




16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:






19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8–98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
23-03-2006 Master’s Thesis Sept 2004 — Mar 2006
Reducing Uncertainty In Effects-Based Operations
McLamb, Wilburn B., Captain, USAF
Air Force Institute of Technology








Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
Known as the fog of war, uncertainty has been prevalent in the conduct of military operations throughout human
history. Intelligence collection efforts are tasked to reduce this uncertainty through the collection of information.
Utilizing Shannon’s entropy as a measure of the expected information gain due to an intelligence collection effort, a
methodology is developed to prioritize and allocate intelligence assets in an efficient manner. Incorporated in this
methodology are target priority and the requirement to reassess dynamic targets. The application area for the
methodology is Effects-Based Operations. A generalized state model is developed to conduct adversary system-of-systems
analysis. This model forms the basis for the entropy calculations and the resultant integer program to maximize the
information gain.
Data Uncertainty, Effects-Based Operations, Shannon’s Entropy, Intelligence Prioritization, Linear Programming,
Military Planning, Military Intelligence, Operations Research
U U U UU 109
David R. Denhard, Lt Col, USAF (AFIT/ENS)
(937) 255–3636, ext 3325
